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ABSTRACT
PHerc. 698 Cr. 3-4: A New Edition
Justin Asay Barney
Department of Comparative Arts & Letters, BYU
Master of Arts
The following is a new edition of PHerc. 698 cr. 3-4, including an introduction, English
translation and commentary. An in-line reprint of PHerc. 19, including a new English translation,
is also included for continuity of thought and language.
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INTRODUCTION
Taken together, PHerc. 19 and PHerc. 698 contain an Epicurean theory of perception. As a
result of the damaged state of the subscription, there is no textual evidence for the title of the
work. However, the content of the text clearly sets it apart as a treatise on the topic of sensation.
Accordingly, Walter Scott hypothesized that the text contained a work by Philodemus, entitled
Περὶ αἰσθήσεως.1 This title has been adopted, since it is viewed as appropriate for the content of
the work. Historically, Philodemus’ authorship of the text has been argued for primarily by
appeal to style. Stylistic similarities between PHerc. 19/698 and known treatises of Philodemus
provided grounds for the attribution.2 However, recent scholarship on the subscription now
corroborates these conjectures regarding the author, and provides an additional hint as to the title
of the work. Gianluca Del Mastro reads the phi of what was probably ‘ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ’.3 And
while no ink can be discerned that indicates the title, the text likely belongs to the same treatise
of Philodemus that is preserved in PHerc. 1003 and PHerc. 1389, fully titled Περὶ αἰσθήεως ἐκ
τῶν Ζήνωνος σχολῶν or On Sensation, from the lectures of Zeno. 4
At some point, the papyrus roll was broken horizontally into two pieces, and so each
piece is identified by a discrete catalogue number. PHerc. 19 contains the upper portion of the
text, whereas PHerc. 698 contains the lower portion. Scott was the first to demonstrate that the

1

Scott 1885, 19. Monet misprints the genitive plural (περὶ αἰσθήσεων) in place of the
singular, and accordingly names the treatise ‘Sur les sensations’ (Monet 1996, 55).
2
Scott 1885, 256; Monet 1996; 55, 62-4.
3
Del Mastro 2014, 41.
4
Hereafter, simply On Sensation. The probable authorship, together with the similarity in
content provides the basis for associating the text with PHerc. 1003 and PHerc. 1389. Cf. Del
Mastro 2014, ad loc.
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two pieces belong to the same papyrus scroll, and he partially joined them together in order to
produce a more complete reconstruction.5
The first edition of the text was made by Scott, whose readings were determined by
consulting primarily the Oxonian disegni. The next edition is also the most recent, and was
completed by Annick Monet in 1996. Monet’s edition is more thorough and comprehensive than
that of her predessesor. She provides detailed orthographic information that had not previously
been made available. Additionally, her edition includes readings of the more difficult sections of
the papyrus, which Scott made no attempt to edit. Therefore, Monet’s edition comprises the sole
reference for the fragments contained in PHerc. 698 cr. 1-2, and a substantial improvement upon
the early columns of the papyrus, which are presented in cr. 3.
I have found Monet’s readings of PHerc. 19 to be largely without flaw. Thus, Monet’s
work should remain the standard edition for this papyrus. However, with the help of improved
microscopes and digital imagery, I have found that some improvement can be made upon her
edition of the lower portion of the scroll, PHerc. 698. Therefore, I present a new edition of
PHerc. 698 cr. 3-4, which contains all the columns of text found in the papyrus, and some
dispossessed fragments.6

HISTORY OF THE MANUSCRIPT
The archive of 1781, which was compiled from Piaggo’s notes, informs us as to the condition of
PHerc. 698 prior to svoglimento. The entry reads:

5

Scott 1885, 254-5.
Due to restraints on time, I have chosen to ignore the fragments of PHerc. 698 for this
study, though my consultation of the relevant cornici (1-2) leads me to suspect that some
improvement could be made upon these as well.
6
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Altro pezzo compresso in varie guise, e scorzato in parte, di lunghezza once 3. 1/2, di
diametro maggiore once 2. 2/57

According to the later 1807 calalogue,8 PHerc. 698 was «dato per insvolgersi a detto [11 Ottobre
1805] di svolti».9 Comparetti reports that the papyrus was unrolled in 1805, although this
information probably reflects the date that the papyrus began the process of svoglimento rather
than the date that this process was completed.10 Hence, Comparetti’s data on this papyrus is
redundant with the 1807 catalogue, and we are left ignorant as to when the svoglitore, Luigi
Catalano, had finished his work. Unfortunately, the 1807 catalogue does not give, as it does with
other papyri, the date that unrolling was complete.
Whatever the date, seven so-called Oxonian disegni were made soon afterwards, and they
appear in an 1806 inventory of Herculaneum disegni.11 The disegnatore was Casanova, and his
disegni were never copied onto copper plates for inclusion in Herculanensium Voluminum (HV).
After Hayter’s departure from Naples in 1809, the Neapolitan disegni were created to
replace the Oxonian copies that accompanied him. The Neapolitan disegni have three authors:
Giovanni Battista Malesci, Carlo Malesci, and Alfonso Cozzi. The earliest disegnatore was G.B.
Malesci, who produced the disengi for fragments 18-27. His work was approved by Bartolomeo
Pessetti with the marking ‘V.B.’ (visto bene), and so must have been completed by 1811, when
7

Blank and Longo 2004, 64. An onica equals approximately 2.2046 cm (see Blank and
Longo 2000, 136 n. 19; Knight and Jorio 1980, 59 n. 16).
8
The ‘Catologo de’ papiri ercolanesi dati per isvolgersi e restituiti, com la indicazione di
quelli donati da S.M. a personaggi esteri’, in Blank and Longo 2004, 139-48.
9
Ibid, 143.
10
Comparetti 1883. Comparetti also records that PHerc. 19 was unrolled in 1804.
However, in the 1807 catalogue we read that although it was «dato per insvolgersi a’ 20
Novembre 1804» it was «svolto nel Febbraio 1805» (See Blank and Longo 2004, 139).
11
Blank and Longo-Auricchio 2004, 131. The shelf mark of the inventory, which is
preserved at the Archivio Storico del Museo Nazionale di Napoli, is A.O.P.B.a XVII 6.
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Pessetti was formally dismissed from the Officina.12 Between 1825 and 1832, C. Malesci, the
son of Giovanni Battista Malesci, drew up fragments 1-17. His work was supervised by Antonio
Ottaviano. Domenico Bassi reviewed the drawings in July of 1907, making corrections and
adding marginal notes with a red pen. Sometime during the same year, one of Bassi’s colleagues
in the Officina,13 Antonio Cozzi, redrafted C. Malesci’s work on fragment 17, and produced a
new disegnο. To this drawing, Bassi added his approval, and in April of 1911 Bassi wrote a
cover sheet to attend the collection of disegni at the Officina in the National Library of Naples.
The concordance of the disegni with the papyri’s content, as well as with Monet and
Scott’s edition, is presented in TABLE 1 below. Unless otherwise noted—in the first few
columns—my enumeration agrees with that of Monet.
TABLE 1: Concordance

Content
Cornice 3
fr. i-ii
fr. iii-xvii
XI (B)
XII (B)
XIII (B)
XIV (B)
XV (B)
XVI (B)
XVII (B)
XVIII (B)
XIX (B)
XX (B)
XXI (B)
XXII (B)
XXIII (B)
XXIV (B)
Cornice 4
12

Cornice

Monet

Scott

N

O

Col. 7a
Col. 7b
Col. 7
Col. 8
Col. 7
Col. 8
Col. 9
Col. 10 (ß)
Col. 10 (à)
Col. 11 (ß)
Col. 11 (à)
Col 12
Col.12 (à)
Col. 13
Col. 14
Col. 15

XI (B)
XII (B)
XIII (B)
--XIII (B)

----fr. 7
--fr. 7
fr. 8
fr. 9
fr. 10
--fr. 11
--fr. 12
--fr. 13
fr. 14
fr. 15

----fr. 7
fr. 8
fr. 7
fr. 8
fr. 9
fr. 10
fr. 10 (à)
fr. 11
--fr. 12
--fr. 13
fr. 14
fr. 15

----361 Γ
--361 Γ
--------361 Χ
-------------

On the dismissal of Pessetti, see Cerasuolo, Capasso and D’Ambrosio 1986, 52-3.
For some background on Antonio Cozzi’s role in the history of the Officina and his
connection to Bassi, see Capasso 2003, 286-8.
13
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XXV (B)
XXVI (B)
XXVII (B)
XXVIII (B)
XXIX (B)
XXX (B)
XXXI (B)
XXXII (B)
XXXIII (B)
XXXIV (B)
XXXV (B)
XXXVI (B)

Col. 17
Col. 18
Col. 19
Col. 20
Col. 21
Col. 22
Col. 23
Col. 24
Col. 25
Col. 26
Col. 27
Col. 28

fr. 17
fr. 18
fr. 19
fr. 20
fr. 21
fr. 22
fr. 23
fr. 24
fr. 25
fr. 26
fr. 27
fr. 28

fr. 17
fr. 18
fr. 19
fr. 20
fr. 21
fr. 22
fr. 23
fr. 24
fr. 25
fr. 26
fr. 27
---

354 a
354 b
360 c
360 d
355 e
355 f
356 g
356 h
357 i
357 k
359 l
359 m

Many papyri were displayed on the walls of the Officina from 1812 until Bassi assumed control
of the Officina in 1906.14 The only record of which papyri were displayed is a single 1865
inventory, which shows that all four cornini of PHerc. 698 hung on the walls of stanza 2 during
this year.15

STATE OF THE MANUSCRIPT
Overall, PHerc. 698 is in worse condition than its partner papyrus PHerc. 19. This may be
because the bottom half of the scoll was more directly exposed to the destructive forces of the
eruption. Regardless of the cause, this evident asymetry might explain why the roll was
eventually broken into two pieces.
PHerc. 698 consists of four cornici. The first two contain a heap of fragments, that were
first edited by Monet. In cr. 3 we begin to read from one principal layer of papyrus, and hence
we start to see discernable columns of text, though the layer problems of cr. 1-2 are evident also
in the beginning of the first pezzo of cr. 3. Cr. 4 is in the best condition and displays nearly

14

Capasso 1986, 177.
For the archive, see Essler 2006, 132-4 which prints AOP XVII 14. Cf. De Jorio 1825,
96, where we read that in his day 16 cadres were hanging in stanza 2.
15
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unbroken columns from begnining to end. The papyrus, which rests of blue cartoncino, is dark
and brittle. Cr. 3 in particular, being in worse condition generally, is deteriorating. A good deal
of material has fallen from the papyrus and can be seen in a heap in the top of the cassetta.
Cr. 3 is divided into two pezzi: one is glued to the upper portion of the cartoncino and
another to the lower portion. The first 11 cm. of pezzo 1 contain multiple layers of papyrus, and
thus report fragments similar to those found in cr. 1-2. Originally, this is the point at which
columns began to be numbered on the cartoncino, begining with col. 7. However, someone has
subsequently marked the beginings and ends of columns with vertical strokes, including what
was believed to be two columns in the first 11 cm. of pezzo 1. These columns are designated ‘7a’
and ‘7b.’ The two pezzi are more or less held in their proper position with goldbeater’s skin, with
one exception that is explained below.
Cr. 4 also contains two pezzi, which are oriented in the same manner as cr. 3. It was
unrolled much more cleanly, and so the ink is more visible and hence easier to read. However,
because the pezzi in cr. 4 are shorter that those in cr. 3, the columns in cr. 4 preserve fewer lines
of text.
TABLE 2: Measurements Of Pezzi In Pherc.698

Cr. Pezzo
3
1 (superiore)
2 (inferiore)
4
1 (superiore)
2 (inferiore)

Dimensions (cm.)
36.9 x 7.8
37 x 7.6
36.3 x 4.5
35.5 x 4.9

LAYOUT OF THE TEXT
Establishing the layout of PHerc. 698 entails two related studies. (1) The order and distribution
of the fragments must be established, and (2) the papyrus must be brought into correspondence

7
with its upper portion, PHerc. 19. If (2) is accomplished successfully, the work of (1) is
complete. But as a check on my own work, I will first complete (1) and then use my findings in
(2) to either confirm of refute my findings.
Overall, the papyrus was laid down in a continuous and intuitive manner, and so each
segment is currently configured on the cartoncino as it would be read in relation to the others,
from left to right, top to bottom. But there are some instances, of course, in which intervening
text is lost between two stretches of papyrus.
Scott hesitates to match the columns of cr. 3, largely as a result of his uncertainty about
how much papyrus was lost between the end of cr. 3 (fr. 15) and the beginning of cr. 4 (fr. 17).16
Although it is possible both to establish the length of missing papyri and to match cr. 3 with
PHerc. 19, Scott is vindicated in his suspicion that some intervening papyrus was lost.
Specifically, one sezione is likely missing between cr. 3 and cr. 4. This can be deduced
from the fact that the space of one sezione would be necessary in order to maintain the standard
column format of the papyrus. Col. XXIV (B) breaks off at the end of cr. 3, only approximately
23 mm. into the line. The first sezione of cr. 4 contains the first half of col. XXV (B), and if
restored it would also contain an intercolumnium of approximately 5 mm. to the left of the
column. Therefore, in order to account for the missing text, we must posit an intervening space
of aproximately 30 mm.17 This corresponds with the measured length of sezioni at this pont in

16

Scott 1885, 254-5. The svoglitore similarly (and rightly) suspected intervening text,
presumably on the basis of a rift between the two cornici: cr. 3 ends midway through a column
(col. XXIV) that is not completed at the beginning of cr. 4. Hence, to be sure, they gave the last
column of cr. 3 the number 15, and the first column of cr. 4 the number 17. Alternatively, this
could be a mistake, as Bassi appears to believe, judging from his marginal notes in the disegno
Napolitano.
17
In this papyrus, line widths average approximately 5 cm and a typical intercolumnum
is 1 cm in length.
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the scroll. Moreover, the difference in length between the last complete sezione of cr. 3 and the
first complete sezione of cr. 4 seems to comport with average length changes between sezioni.
A similar method can be used to establish the absence of another sezione in cr. 3. As it
stands on the cartoncino, the cornice seems, prima facie, to present a continuous stretch of
papyrus. When breaks occur in the papyrus, unbroken stips of membrane connect the two pieces.
This inspires confidence that the space between the pieces is approximately equal to the space
that existed between them as they were unrolled on Piaggio’s machine. However, this confidence
is challenged in coll. 12-13. If the papyrus of col. 12 is contiguous to that of col. 13, then
columns XXI (B) and XXII (B) are much too close together, since there is almost no space where
the bulk of column XXI (B) should be read. There are two possible explanations: (i) the current
position of the pezzi on the cartoncino is accurate. Therefore, each piece must display text that is
written on a discrete layer of papyrus. Hence, there are no such problems with the column
measurements, since the two columns are not to be construed as consecutive. If this is the case,
the papyrus in coll. 7a-12 should be conceived of as falling one circumference previous to col.
13. By moving the papyrus in this way, the proper amount of space would be made for the
columns to appear as they would had the papyrus been unrolled in one continuous layer.
Alternatively, (ii) the current placement of the pezzi is deceptive, and we should posit a space
between them that corresponds to what standard column measurements require. Although the
two pieces are attached with an unbroken stip of membrane, the svoglitore must have placed the
two pieces onto the cartoncino next to one another, despite the fact that some intervening
papyrus was lost.
(i) cannot be the case, since restoring one circumference (ca. 69 mm.) of papyrus would
leave us in nearly the same perdicament in which we currently find ourselves. From beginning to
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beginning, a columnn in this papyrus measures ca. 60 mm., and the remaining 9 mm. is not
nearly enough to account for what needs to be restored in col. XXI (B). According to (ii), we
should posit a complete sezione (ca. 34 mm.) in addition to the 8 mm. that seems to have been
lost from col. 12 (à). If 42 mm. of papyrus is restored, sufficient room is made for the insertion
of col. XXI (B).
Outside of these two instances, little papyrus is lost between fragments. Breaks between
pezzi are the result of deliberate cuts by the svoglitore, and so very little papyrus is lost. The
maximum amount lost between cuts appears between pezzo 1 and 2 in cr. 3, where 2 cm. are
missing.
In his edition, Scott matched the columns of cr. 4 to its corresponding columns in PHerc.
19. However, he did not join PHerc. 698 cr. 3 to the columns of PHerc. 19. Monet does matches
these columns, using coll. XVIII and XXIII as points of connection.18 The similarity in content
and vocabulary between col. XVIII (A) and XVIII (B) leads her to believe that they belong to the
same column of text.19 In addition, she finds that the text of XXIII (A) naturally introduces the
text of XXIII (B).20 By establishing these points of correspondence, she attempts to join the
columns of cr. 3 with those in PHerc. 19 cr. 5-6.
The collocation of the tops of PHerc. 19 and the bottoms in cr. 4—which Scott
performed and Monet confirmed—seems correct. However, we cannot accept Monet’s matching
of the columns in cr. 3 based upon the evidence she provides. Similarities in vocabulary and
plausiblility of continuous argumentation do not constitute sufficient evidence that two pieces of
18

When discussing the text proper, I use Monet’s column numbers. Her numbering
system is determined by PHerc. 19, as it contains a larger stretch of columns than PHerc. 698,
and therefore none of my emendations require a revision of her system. When referencing
attributes of the papyrus, I use the numbers as they appear on the cornici.
19
Monet 1996, 33-4.
20
Monet 1996, 34.
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papyrus do in fact contain text from the same column. As Blank notes, «joining columns by
finding similarities in thought and diction and then conjecturing the sense and the grammar is, of
course possible, but dangerous».21 More appropriate is evidence derived from the physical
remains of the papyrus itself, by which «an objective check on the reconstruction of conjectural
contexts may be obtained».22
Because κολλήσεις run vertically down the entirety of the papyrus, each κολλήσις
presents an opportunity to join the two papyri and restore their original relationship. When a
κολλήσις is found in PHerc. 19 that also appears in the same position, relative to the column, in
PHerc. 698, a join can be sucessfully established. In each instance where a join is identified, the
two joined papyri present the same layer of papyrus, and hence the column read on PHerc. 19 is
continued on PHerc. 698. If the conclusions presented above are correct, the κολλήσεις of
PHerc. 698 and PHerc. 19 should naturally align when they are distributed based upon the
proposed physical reconstruction of the papyrus.
In fact, the presence of κολλήσεις do provide the evidence to substantiate the claims
made above. Two κολλήσεις fix the position of the papyri on either side of the relevant breaks.
The situation can be viewed in FIGURE 1. Three sections of papyrus are labelled (a), (b) and (c)
and I have digitally repositioned (b) appropriately.23 The break from (a) to (b) constitutes the
break between col. 12 and col. 13, and the break between (b) and (c) constitutes the break
between col. 15 and col. 17 (cr. 3 and cr. 4). The text on (a) and (c) can be read continuously
across the papyrus, and no significant change on layer can be detected. Being a part of cr. 4, (c)

21

Blank 2008, 259.
Ibid. The following method for establishing joins is taken from Blank’s work.
23
While (b) does in fact contain two separate pieces of papyrus, they are held together by
a taut strip of goldbeaters skin and so the validity of their arrangement will not be questioned
here.
22
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continues in an unbroken stretch of papyrus for the remainder of the treatise. There is no space
either before or after (b) to reposition it as a sottoposto or sovraposto, respectively, should it
belong to a lower or higher level. They must belong to the same level, and hence must be
repositioned to fit into their appropriate columns, as reflected in FIGURE 1.

FIGURE 1: Coll. XXVIII – XXV
Images have been manipulated to account for the joins in the papyri

FIGURE 2

details the correspondence of PHerc. 19 with PHerc. 698, taking into account all the

joins that can be made in the papyrus. The column numbers, as seen on the cornici of each
papyrus, are provided, as are the column numbers of the text.

12
FIGURE 2: Correspondence of Papyri
The relationship between PHerc. 19/698, as indicated by the disposition of

. Digital images have been manipulated to bring the papyri into proper alignment.
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As can be seen above, my own investigation of PHerc. 19/698 shows that the way in which
Monet matches the two papyri is correct.24 However, her matching of some of the first textual
columns is less secure, and I have had to alter her distribution of coll. XI (B) -XIII (B). It is clear
from the stratigraphy that while the sezioni can be paired with PHerc. 19 the way Monet
imagines, unfortunately the text upon them cannot so easily be put into place.

COMPOSITIONAL FEATURES AND FORMATING
Cavallo designates the hand of PHerc. 19/698 as belonging to group K, and estimates that the
text was written in the second half of the first century.25 Monet provides a rigorous desciption of
the hand, scribal signs (paragraphos, diple, coronis, asteriskos), notes on the scribes’ method of
marking abbreviations, corrections and deletions, and supplies a thorough listing of spatia vacua,
and so I defer to her treatment of these matters.26
Monet estimates that PHerc. 19/698 is approximately 20 cm. in height. This figure is
based upon Cavallo’s general observation that the ratio between the height and width of columns
tends to be around 3:1 for columns between 5-6 cm. in width.27 The total height, then, is
achieved by multiplying the average column width (5 cm) by three and adding the height of the
top and bottom margins (T: ≥2.5; B: ≥2.3). However, the height of the column is the most
important, for it is with reference to this figure that we can attempt to establish the number of
lines that are lost between PHerc. 19 and PHerc. 698. Unfortunately, Cavallo’s observation
cannot be taken as very precise, and if the column format in 19/698 diverges from Cavallo’s ratio

24

For Monet’s table of correspondences, see Monet 1996, 53-4.
Cavallo 1983, 53.
26
Monet 1996, 28-31.
27
Cavallo 1983, 19. For her explanation, of which the following is only a summary, see
Monet 1996, 27-8.
25
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at all (which is likely the case), the result will be significant in establishing the height of, and
hence the number of lines in, a column.
Regarding the height of the papyrus, since margins cannot be seen in their entirety, the
measurements provided must be taken as minumum measurements, and thus all we can say of
the papyrus’ height (if the ratio of column width-height is accurate) is that it is at least 20 cm.
Since the text contains no discernible stichometric signs, the length of the papyrus canot
be determined precisely. However, an estimate can be given based upon several rough figures:
the average decline per circumference (δ), the outer radius and the inner radius of the scroll.28
The average decline per circumference is around 2 mm. From the 1781 archive, we know that the
outer radius was 26.4 mm. And the inner circumference is around 3.18, a figure that can be
deduced from the final circumference of the papyrus (10 mm). Using Janko’s equation, the
length of PHerc. 698 should be approximately 7.127 meters.29

THE CONTENTS
Philodemus’ On Sensation fits naturally in the historical progression of Hellenistic philosophy.
After the deaths of Plato, Aristotle and their immediate successors, the Epicureans and the Stoics
were the only groups to take much interest in perception as a subject to be analyzed
systematically.30 The peripatos, for example, largely focused its efforts on ethics, and gave little
attention to philosophy of mind generally. Thus, Philodemus should be viewed as contributing to
a dialogue between Epicurean and Stoic theories of perception, along with interpretations of
Aristotle and Plato. While the emendations I have made to cr. 3-4 will provide readers with an
28

For the method used to approximate the scroll length, see Janko 2011, 43-6.
When Lroll = 2π [ir1 + (t ÷ 2)i2]. Provided the above figures, in PHerc. 698, t ≈ .3 mm
and i = 77 layers.
30
Annas 1992, 10-2; Lynch 1972, 139-40.
29
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improved text, they do not require great revisions to our understanding of Philodemus’ argument.
Thus, Monet’s general outline of the papyrus’ content remains adequate, and the virtues of
previous studies endure.31 Nevertheless, I present here some aspects of the text which should be
of interest to students of the Hellenistic philosophy, and which may, in my view, comprise
fruitful areas for further study.
First, PHerc. 19/698 is the first Epicurean text to address self-consciousness
unambiguously. While previous Epicurean thinkers made statements that may imply a type of
self-consciousness, none address the issue directly, or with enough detail that it could constitute
a theory. To my knowledge, little, if any, work has been done on Philodemus’ theory of selfconsciousness and how it fits into the history of philosophy.
Typically, self-consciousness is explained as either (1) an essential part of our mental
states, or as (2) a higher-order mental state.32 In other words, when I look at a picture, my
perception of the picture and my awareness that I am currently seeing the picture are either
discrete parts of the same perception, and are hence parts of the same mental state, or
alternatively they belong to discrete perceptions. In this case, my self-consciousness is a
perception of my own perception, and the latter directs itself on my perception of the picture.
Thus, self-consciousness is of a higher-order mental state.
Epicurus recognized self-consciousness only insofar as having feelings that accompany
our perceptions can be said to entail our consciousness of them.33 This alone does not allow us to

31

For an outline of Philodemus’ argument in PHerc. 19/698, see Monet 1996, 55-72.
For a good overview of the strengths and weaknesses of each view, as well as an
interpretation of Aristotle’s hybrid view, see Caston 2002.
33
Her. 38.4-7, 52.5-53.8. See Glidden 1979. I do not follow Glidden’s translation of
ἐπαισθήσις, in opposition to αἰσθήσις, as ‘recognition’, since translating the term thus would
seem to contradict Philodemus’ claim that the senses do not have intuitive power (cf. col.
XXVIII.A). The synonymy of the ἐπαισθήσις and αἰσθήσις defended in Asmis 1984, 162-4.
32
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place Epicurean theory in either camp, for these texts say nothing of what form the affections
take, and precisely how they operate in the maneuverings of the mind. Philodemus seems to
make explicit the connection between affections and self-consciousness, and he identifies
affections as ‘sense perceptions of themselves’ (ἑαυτῶν ἐπαισθήσεις, col. XII). This is
underscored in col. XV, where Philodemus says that we have a perception of pleasure that is
discrete from our perception of the object that produces it. In the same column, Philodemus
makes another important claim: that “we also have a perception of (ἐπαισθάνεσθαι) the fact of
seeing.”
These claims present two descriptions of perception, both of which involve selfconsciousness, and each involves two discrete steps. Put in terms of the perception of a
(pleasing) picture, they run as follows:

(1) A perceiving subject (i) comprehends the picture, and subsequently (ii) has a
perception of comprehending the picture.
(2) A perceiving subject (i) comprehends the picture, and subsequently (ii) has a
perception of pleasure.

Not all the details of this scheme are worked out in the extant text. Is step (ii) of each case meant
to be in some way equivalent? Philodemus seems to indicate that affections are coterminous with
and ‘produced in’ sense perception (col. XI). This would suggest that affections arise as a part of
step (i), and hence (1(ii)) having a perception of our comprehending the picture would involve
(2(ii)) having a perception of pleasure. But this is not addressed clearly. Further, what prevents
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infinite regress? If I perceive my own perceptions, do I not also perceive my second, third, and
fourth-order perceptions, and so on ad absurdum?
Despite these unanswered questions, what seems likely is that Philodemus is describing a
theory that conceives of self-consciousness as a higher-order mental state, which is discrete from
the comprehension of perceptible objects, and which directs itself intentionally upon them. This
is a new claim in Epicurean philosophy, and one that is first attested in Philodemus.

Philodemus also claims that the senses cannot ‘discern’ (κρίνειν). Discernment seems to involve
making intuitive claims about a perception, which are not required by the perceptual data
received. The nature of such claims are various, but always unwarranted. Philodemus maintains
that hearing cannot discern the suitability of a poem’s style (col. XXXIII), nor can smell discern
the identity of an herb from its scent (col. XXXIII), nor can sight discern what will happen
subsequent to the event it currently witnesses (col. XXX). This is because the senses do not
involve themselves in one another’s domain. Philodemus observes that “although sight does not
discern solidity, some err in thinking that it does discern” (XXIX.B). The perception of stones is
given as an example. The bulk of the example is lost, but the point can easily be restored: when
such people perceive stones, they mistakenly think that their sight reports the stones’ solidity,
when in truth sight only reports on the color of the stones. It is not sight itself that discerns the
rocks solidity, but rather it is our mental faculties, which intuit their solidity as a result of its
previous observations (διὰ παρατηρήσεως, col. XXXI.A) of stones.
This view stands in opposition to the standard Stoic theory, which takes perception to
include much more than the reception of data.34 For the Stoic, the perceptive process (αἰσθήσις)

34

Diogenes Laertius 7.52
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includes (i) the reception of an appearance, which conveys the sense data of the perceptible
object; (ii) the interpretation of such data, relative to the perceiver’s understanding, into a
propositional with linguistic form (τὸ λεκτόν), and (iii) an assent to the λεκτόν. Only when the
data has been interpreted by the perceiver and formulated into mental language is it assented to.
Any discernment that might result from the perceiver’s prior experience occurs during the
process of perception, in step (ii), and influences the content of the resulting λεκτόν. In the Stoic
view, ‘discernment’ holds a significant place in the process of perception, and so takes place
during perception rather than after the fact.
‘Discernment’ falls under the banner of what Aristotle calls ‘incidental perception’.
Incidental perception admits of error, but it is nevertheless categorized as a type of perception.35
So when Philodemus claims that smell cannot discern that the source of the odor is frankincense
(col. XXXIII), Aristotle would respond that it can, but only incidentally, and without the promise
of accuracy. This response is not entirely satisfying. To what extent incidental involves the
intellectual faculties and to what extent it involves the comprehension of sense data by the sense
organs is unclear. It seems, however, that whereas, to Philodemus, perception does not include
making inferences based upon sensory attributes, to Aristotle, as with the Stoics, ‘discernment’ is
built into the perceptive process.

35

Like Philodemus, Aristotle favors the proprietary sensibles, for “of the per se
perceptibles those are most strictly perceptible which are proper to a given sense” (De Anima
418a24-5). It is the proprietary sensibles that, as in Epicurus’ scheme, do not admit of error (De
insomn. 2, 459b7-13). However, he does delineate two other types of peception that function
with less accuracy: incidental perception and the perception of the common sensibles. On
incidental perception, De Anima 418a8 ff., 425a14 ff., and 428b18 ff., cf. Owens 1982,
Cashdollar 1973.
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PHerc. 19/698 also shows how Philodemus deals with the phenomenon which Aristotle calls the
‘common sensibles’ (κοινὰ αἰσθητά). Though theories involving the common sensibles seem not
to be limited to Aristotle, his is the only one of which we have any details, and so PHerc. 19/698
serves to illustrate the difference between Epicurean and Aristotelian conceptions.36
Aristotle asserts that while some sensibles are perceptible by only one sense, others are
perceptible by all the senses. Thus, he divided sensibles into two categories: (i) proprietary
sensibles and (ii) common sensibles. Proprietary sensibles can only be perceived by their
proprietary sense organ. For instance, sight alone perceives color, and taste alone perceives
flavor. Common sensibles are not associated with a single sense, but are perceivable by all the
senses, or at least by more than a single, proprietary sense.37 Aristotle includes movement, rest,
number, shape and magnitude in his list of the common sensibles.38
Whereas Aristotle presents a theory in which each sensible is divided neatly into one of
two discrete kinds, Philodemus appears to contradict himself in providing his taxonomy of
objects of discrimination. He admits that some objects of discrimination can be common (coll.
XXV-XXVI). But he simultaneously asserts that objects of discrimination are always proprietary
to a single sense, explicitly stating that “one sense does not concern itself with the other’s object
of discrimination” (col. XX.A). The trouble may be cleared up by considering the terminology
used by these two philosophers.

36

Philodemus, for example, does not appear to be reacting to Aristotle’s theory in
particular, contra Monet 1996, 748. Terminological differences between the two authors, for
instance, indicate that Philodemus was likely not commenting on Aristotle’s system.
37
De Anima 418a14-20. Aristotle weakens his claim that the common sensibles are
common to all the senses (κοινὰ πάσαις) in De Anima 425b10-1; De Sensibus 422b4-8.
38
De Anima 418a14-20; In De Sensibus 437a9, Aristotle removes rest from his list of the
common sensibles, presumably because it is simply an absence of movement.
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Philodemus and Aristotle use different vocabulary to identify objects that we perceive,
and the terms they use have a different range of uses. Aristotle speaks of ‘sensibles’ (τὰ
αἰσθητά), which designate discrete categories of sensible objects, such as movement, color,
shape or taste. Philodemus speaks of ‘objects of discrimination (κρίµατα). 39 Although the
objects of discrimination refer to the same kinds of categories that Aristotle calls sensibles,
Philodemus does not conceive of all these categories in the same way that Aristotle does.
Aristotle divides the sensibles into two categories according to their capacity to be perceived by
a singular sense or a plurality of senses, but all the sensibles play the same part in the process of
perception. Each sensible is perceived in the same way, directly and individually, since each
sensible constitutes a discrete category. However, Philodemus does not seem to think of the
objects of perception as playing parallel roles in perception. He distinguishes the objects of
discrimination based upon how they are perceived. The common objects of perception are
perceived as a part of the proprietary ones. Philodemus’ apparently contradictory remarks in On
Sensation are clarified when it is understood that he views the ‘so-called common’ objects of
discrimination simply as a common quality that inheres in the proprietary objects of perception.
Philodemus thinks of the former as a completely different type of perceptible object, a
phenomenon that is discriminated but is not on par with the proprietary sensibles, which to
Philodemus are the main referent of the term.
Philodemus nests the common objects of discrimination inside of the proprietary objects
of discrimination. While neither object of discrimination is any less real, and both are perceived

39

The term κρίµα need not denote a family of objects, such as is suggested by the
translation ‘sphere of discernment’, but it may (Sedley 1989, 126). The word αἰσθητός is
supplied by Monet in several lacunose passages, but its use by Philodemus is secure in only one
instance. In this case (col. XIX), it does not parallel Aristotle’s terminological usage, but
functions as an adjective rather than as a substantive.

21
things (κρίµατα), the former seem to be a part of the latter. In Aristotle’s scheme, each type of
sensible is discrete, and each is perceived directly rather than incidentally, as the result of a
higher-order intellectual operation.40 This leads to confusion over the relationship between
proper and common sensibles, and why the perception of common sensibles is liable to error
when the perception of proper sensibles is not. Philodemus avoids these problems altogether by
conceiving of the common objects of discrimination as inherent properties of the proprietary
objects of discrimination.
Aristotle needs the various senses to agree on the single nature of the common sensibles,
since perception is the process of receiving a body’s sensible form. Philodemus does not imagine
the common sensibles as having a single nature. Sight cannot “comprehend the magnitude and
shape of body” (XX.A), for an object has many magnitudes and shapes corresponding to the
different senses, and the magnitude and shape of and object’s body is different from the
magnitude and shape of the same object’s color. The so-called common objects of discrimination
are common to all the senses in that they transmit a common quality (κοινότητα, col. XXVI.A),
which is manifested in all the proprietary objects of discrimination. But each sense only reports
on the quality as it relates to its own proprietary object of discrimination. David Sedley appears
to be correct when he says that “when shape and size are observed to be common objects of
touch and taste this is no more than a half truth. They are, but not the same shape and size. At
best, the author explains with exemplary clarity, the shape and size reported by vision are
analogous to the shape and size reported by touch.”41 To Aristotle, all the senses together
reported on the singular shape and size of an object. To Philodemus, sight reports on visible
shape and visible magnitude, whereas touch reports on tactile shape and tactile magnitude.
40
41

De Anima II.6. cf. Owens 1982.
Sedley 1989, 134.
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Moreover, shape and magnitude are common features inherent in every type of sense perception,
not just of sight and touch. Hence, Philodemus must strain himself to describe more unintuitive
categories such as the shape of sound (XXVI.B-XXVII.A).

THIS EDITION
Because much of PHerc. 698 was ignored by Scott and the disegnatori, in many places Monet’s
edition constitutes the first reading of the text. In the more tortured areas of the papyrus,
including cr. 3 as a whole, there are many areas in need of improvement. A closer investigation
of the stratigraphy reveals a number of ruptures in the text that upset Monet’s readings. Where
Monet reads a continuous column as if all the ink appeared on the same layer, it is clear from
autopsy that the text she reads appears on multiple layers of papyrus, and hence they really
belong to separate columns. Such findings, for example, require that we relegate Monet’s XI (B)
into the category of dispossessed fragments. Since the topography is particularly variable at the
begining of cr. 3, the text cannot be placed into its proper column with any certainty.
Additionally, some text can be read now where it has not been read before. The best example of
this is in Monet XII (B), where I record fourteen fragments that had not previously been
published. To these new fragments are ascribed roman numerals, which serves to differentiate
them from the fragments that Monet records in her edition with Arabic numerals. As with any
new edition, some new readings are made and old readings are corrected simply by virtue of
bringing new eyes to the text.
This edition was created as a result of my consultation of the papyrus, infared
photographs and disegni at the Officina. In what follows, I provide a new edition of cornici 3 and
4 of PHerc. 698, what Monet designated as full columns of text. So that the reader may read the
text continuously (rather than reading only the lower portion of columns), I also reprint Monet’s
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transcription of PHerc. 19 in line with my readings of PHerc. 698.42 Accordingly, what is
printed here only comprises the last two-thirds of the treatise, and the preceding upper portions
of ten columns are not included. For continuity in language, I provide an English translation of
both papyri.

42

For the details of Monet’s readings, consult the app. crit. in Monet 1996. When a
departure is made from Monet’s transcription, it is marked with an asterisk and Monet’s reading
is noted.
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CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM
P = PHerc. 698
O = apographum Oxeniense PHerc. 698
N = apographum Neapolitanum PHerc. 698
Bassi = in margine apographi Neapolitani
Graham = privatim
Monet = Monet 1996
Scott = Scott 1885
‡ Barney
CONSPECTUS SIGNORUM
α̣
`α´
⟦α⟧
α
[α]
{α}
‹α›
…
[.]
[- - -]

littera dubia vel valde mutila
littera supra lineam scripta
littera a librario expuncta
littera supposita vel supraposita ab editore recognita
littera ab editore suppleta
littera ab editore expuncta
littera ab editore addita
litterarum vestigia
lacuna ubi litterarum deperditarum numerus definiri potest
lacuna ubi litterarum deperditarum numerus definiri non potest
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Fragments i-ii
Col. 7a, cr. (XI.B Monet, ---Scott, --- N, --- O)

(i)
1.

5.
8.

- - -]νδεµ
- - -]σ̣χ̣ησ
- - -] π̣ερὶ τῶν
- - -]α̣µε
- - -]σ̣εξαι[.]οι
- - -]ε̣ν̣τις εξ[
- - -]α̣ι διὰ τοῦ .
].[

1 ναµε Monet 3 π]ερὶ Monet 4 µε Monet
5 εξαι[ Monet 6 εξον Monet 7 post τοῦ,
upward slanting left foot 8 ο̣ vel σ̣

[Too fragmentary to translate]
(ii)
1.

5.

10.
12.

- - -]δο
--------- - -]α̣ν
- - -]ν
- - -]νου δὴ τω
- - -αἰ]σθήσεις µη̣
- - -]…[…]..
- - -]ητω
- - -]µ̣ε̣
[Too fragmentary to translate]

1-7 nihil Monet 9 µ Monet 10-2 nihil
Monet
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Fragments iii-xvii
Col. 7b, cr. (XII.B Monet, --- Scott, --- N, --- O)

(iii)
(iv)
(v)

- - -]βα̣[- - - - -]χειν[- - - - -]ην.(.)τικας ε[- - - - -].φερειν δεµ[- - - - - λα]µβά[νει]ν[- - - - -]ἀπὸ αγ[- - (vi)
- - -]α[- - - - -]ον[- - (vii) - - -]εν[- - - - -]ι̣[- - - - -]ου[- - (viii) - - -]εν[- - - - -]πεπ[- - - - -]…[- - (ix)
- - -]οντα[- - (x)
- - -]το̣[- - - - -]η̣σ[- - (xi)
- - -]νκ̣[- - (xii) - - -]π̣[- - - - -].µ[- - (xiii) - - -]..[- - - - -]σ̣ κατα[- - - - -]εκ…[- - (xiv) - - -]οεσ̣
- - -]θαµε
(xv) - - -]πρυ[- - (xvi) - - -]ο̣σ[- - (xvii) - - -]υς ρ̣α̣.[- - -

(iii)-(xvii) - - - Monet
(v) 2 ante φ: bottom right of (α)
(xvii) post α̣: τ̣ vel π̣

FIGURE 3: Fragments of Col. 7b

[Too fragmentary to translate]
FIGURE 3 illustrates

the disposition of fragments in col. 7b.
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ΧI.A
ους καὶ κατάληψι[ν] | καταλήψ[ε]ως ἀλλ᾽ ἔν[εστι] | καὶ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τῶι κα|ταλαµβάνει‹ν›· παρὸν
γὰρ | τὸ πάθος ἐν ἐπαισθή|σ̣ει γίνετ᾽ αὐτῆι ἐπειδὴ | [αὐτ]ῆς ἐστιν πάθος καὶ | [ἐ]ν αὐτῆι
καταλαµβά|[ν]ετ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς, ὅταν πα|[ρ]ῆι τὸ χρῶµα, τῆς ἐπαισ|[θ]ήσεως γίνε[τ]αι προσ|δ̣εὴς
ἵνα καταληφθῆ[ι]· | λέγων δὲ τις ἡ[µ]ᾶς φάσ|κοντας τὰ π[ά]θη καὶ ἑαυ|τῶν εἶν[αι κ]ατ[α]λ[ήψεις]
| ε̣ι̣πιν̣[- - -]|[- - -]
…and a comprehension of comprehension, but it is present even in itself by comprehending. For
whenever the affection is present, it is produced in sense perception itself, since the affection is
of sense perception and is comprehended in it, but, not as whenever color is present, is
perception required in order that it be comprehended. But there is someone who says that we
claim that affections are comprehensions of themselves…
XI.B
Col. 7, cr. (XIII.B Monet, fr. 7 Scott N, 361Γ O)

1.

5.

- - -]κα[- - - - -]….[- - - - -]αιµα[- - - - -ἡ]δονη[- - - - -]ζει δ[- - - - -]τη[- - - - -]του.[- - ---

1-2 desunt O 1 καιδια N 2 deest Monet
Bassi 3 α[.]µα Monet καιµα N 4
ἡδονὴ<ν> Monet 5 ίζει Monet Scott ιζ
Bassi τιζο N ιζειν O 6 ν τη Monet O την N
7 τους N τοῦ Monet Bassi O

…pleasure…
Monet, Scott and the disegnatori all read this fragments as the beginning of XIII.B. I have
separated it and present it as likely belonging to the middle of column XI.B. If the fragments are
viewed as a single column, the visible ink necessitates that the column length would be at least 6
cm., which significantly exceeds the standard measurement of 5 cm. Moreover, previous readers
saw additional letters to the left of what I print above. While these letter forms can no longer be
seen on the papyrus, there is some legible text in line 2, which seems to be on the same layer as
the lines below it. These letters appear to the left of the rest of the text beneath it, showing that
the column is wider than it currently appears, and even wider than the now-invisible letters
would make it seem. The letters in this line appear further left than the letters previous readers
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believed initiated a new column, in the space that would have constituted the left margin.
Conceiving the two fragments as a single column, previous readers have struggled to make sense
of the text. For example, Scott and Monet read νοµ|ίζει (lines 4-5) and Monet reads διαφέρο|ν
(lines 5-6), both of which violate the rules of syllabification.43 If placed one revolution to the left
of its present position on the cornice, it would be read in XI.B. In providing his own
reconstruction of the Greek, Scott recognizes that “it is doubtful whether the right and the left
half belong to the same column” (298).

43

See Janko 2000, 75-6; of particular relevance are rules (i) and (iv). See also
Obbink 1996 73-4.
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XII.A
ἑαυτά· δι̣όπερ οὐδ᾽ ὅ|ταν φῶµεν τ[οῖς] πά|θεσι καταλαµ[βά]νεσ|θαι τὰς ποιότητας, αὐτοῖς |
ἀποδίδοµεν τοῖς πάθε|σιν ἰδίας καταλήψεις, ἀλ|λὰ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις | διὰ τῶν παθῶν, οὐδ᾽ ὅ|ταν
ἑαυτῶν ἐπαισθή|σεις ε[ἶ]ναι τὰ πάθη καὶ | κατατη[ρήσεις] ἑαυτῶν, | ἐπαισθήσεις αὐτοῖς
ἀ|πολε[ί]ποµεν, κἂν τὰς | ἐπαισθήσεις ἐπαισθά|[ν]εσθαι λέγωµε[ν ....] η| [- - -] εινει|[- - -]
…themselves. This is precisely why, whenever we say that qualities are comprehended by
affections, we do not make individual comprehensions dependent on the affections themselves,
but on the sense organs through the affections. And whenever we say that the affections are
sense perceptions of themselves and observations of themselves, we do not leave them sense
perceptions, even if we say that sense perceptions perceive…
XII.B
Col. 8, cr. (--- Monet, --- Scott, fr. 8 N, --- O)

[- - -]θ̣ατε ειβ.[- - -]
[- - -]δευ̣[- - -] 	
  

1 ει Bassi τασει N 2 δει N

[Too fragmentary to translate]
This fragment is pulled from col. XIV.B, in which it appears sottoposto. It was transferred one
circumference (ca. 80 mm.) to the left in order to find its proper position in the treatise.
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XIII.A
παρουσία[.] καὶ τῶι τὴν | ἐπαίσθησιν αὐτὰ πα|ρ[έ]χειν τοῖς αἰσθητηρί|οις τῶν ποιοτήτων καὶ |
αὐτὰ εἶναι {τοῖς αἰσθη|τηρι} ἐπαισθήσεις, ὥσ|τε τὸ κεφαλαιωδέ[στ]α|τον οὐ λέγοµεν εἶναι
τοι|οῦτον, ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητή[ρ]ι|ον τ[ὰ πάθη κρίνειν] καὶ δ̣ι|ὰ τούτου [τὸ αὐτὸ τὴν]*| ποιό[τη]τα
κ[ατα]λαµβά|νει, τὰ δὲ παρ[ὰ τ]οῦτο πάν|τ᾽ ἀθετέ[ον]. Διὸ [κ]αὶ τὸ δὲ | τ[…..]νυφ [….]νειτ[..| - -]ονολοντα| [- - -]ων |[- - …they claim that…presence, and, by giving perception of qualities to the sense organs, that they
themselves constitute sense perceptions, so that we do not say that the principal matter is this,
namely that the sense organ discerns affections and by this means the same comprehends quality,
and all beyond this is to be rejected. For this reason…
XIII.B
Col. 7, cr. (fr. 7 Scott N, 361Γ O)

1.

5.

9.

- - -]µ̣η[- - - - -]ειπα[.(.)]γοσ̣.[- - - - -]µεν τὴ̣ν ι̣δο̣...ν
- - -] τῆς ἡδον[ῆς - - - - - λ]α̣µβάνεσθαι νο̣[
- - -]οπε̣[ρ] oὐδὲν διαφ̣[
- - -]ου τὴν ἡδονὴ//ν ἡδ//
- - -]θαι π[- - --[Too fragmentary to translate]

* τούτου [τὰ πάθη τὴν] Monet

1 deest Monet N O 2 [.]π [ Monet ειπαισεα
N ειπασσελ O γο vel π γω̣ πο̣ 3 τὴν [.]ξ|
Monet µεντινδ N µεντηνιζ O 4 ἡδον[ῆς ἡ
Monet ἡδ[ονῆς] Scott 5 λα]µβάνεσθαι
νο[µ]- Monet µκανεωαι O µηανεσθαι N 7
οὐ Monet, lit. //ν ἡδ// O 8 [..]θαιτο Monet
τω O απ N
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XIV.A
πε]|ρὶ ἑ̣αυτὰς παθῶν κρ[ί]|σιν µ̣ὴ προσφέρ̣ε̣[σθαι] | διὰ τ̣ὸ µηδεµίαν [ἅ]π̣τε̣σ|θαι καὶ θιγγάνειν τῶν
| παθῶν· ὡς γὰρ ἡµῶν, | ὅταν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητη|ρίων τὰ πάθη κρίνεσ|θαι νοµίζωµεν, ἔξω | τε αὐτὰ
φασκ̣όντων ὑ|ποπίπτειν κα[ὶ εἴσ]ω | τι […] ἐ̣π[̣ ὶ πάθη]| τὴ̣[ν] αἴσθησιν γίνε[σ]|θαι καθάπερ ἐπὶ
χ[υλὸ]ν | καὶ ὀσµήν, ταῦτα λέ|[γουσιν ...]τα µε [- - …concerning themselves…that they (the sense organs) do not bring about the discrimination of
affections, because none of them touch and handle the affections. For as, whenever we think that
the affections are discerned by the sense organs, we claim that they occur on the exterior
and…sensation occurs on the interior upon the affections, just as upon flavor and odor. They say
that these things….
XIV.B
Col. 8, cr. (fr. 8 Scott N, --- O)

1.

5.

10.

τo.
τὸ γεν[έσθαι - - ….δε[..]ος[- - ..]εῦ̣σθαι πλὴ[ν .]π[..
.]..(.)ν̣υ[..]οὕ̣τως
- - -]ε τὰ πάθη κα[ταληψεις ἐαυτῶν εἶνα[ι
πρὸς τὸ γενέσθα[ι
ἐπαισθήσει καὶ κα[ταλήψει τὸ αἰσθη[τήριον
- - -]ασ
- - -]αι ειν[- - -

1-3 versus desunt N 1 deest Monet post το
µ̣ vel α̣ 3 - - -]θ[- - - Monet 4 εῖσθαι
Monet N παντ N 5 λιτικον N 8 γένεσθα[ι
Scott 9-10 κα|...λι....επι...εθη... N 10 ἡ
αἰσθή[σις Graham 12 ν εἶναι Monet

…the affections are comprehensions of themselves, to the extent that the sense organ
comes to be…by sense perception and by comprehension…
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XV.A
τὴν ὄψι[ν], ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ | ὁρᾶν ἐ[π]αισ[θ]άνεσθαι, | παρα[πλ]η̣[σίω]ς δ᾽οὐδ ⟦εσ⟧ `ἥ´|δεσθα[ι
µ]όνον ὑπὸ τῆς | εὐχροίας, ἀλ[λὰ κ]αὶ κατ᾽ αὐ|τὴν παρο[υσία]ν̣ τῆς ἡ|δονῆς ἐπ[αισθ]άνεσθαι |
τῆ[ς ἡ]δον[ῆ]ς καὶ οὐχ ἑ|τέρωι πάθει· τὸ δ᾽ ἀνα|λογοῦν ἀ̣κουστέον | [κ]αὶ ἐπὶ τ[ῶ]ν ἄλ[λ]ων
αἰσ|θ̣η̣τ̣ηρίω[ν]· τοῦτου δή|π[ο]υ λεγοµένου πρὸς | [ἡ]µῶν ὄντως ὅταν φῶ|µεν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ |
[τ]ὰς α̣[ἰσθήσεις κατὰ|λήψεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι | - - …visual impression, but we also have a perception of the fact of seeing, and similarly we do not
only feel pleasure because of the beautiful color, but we also have a perception of pleasure
corresponding to the very presence of pleasure and not by another affection. This analogy must
be understood also in the case of the other sense organs. This is surely what we really mean
whenever we say that both affections and sensations [are comprehensions of themselves].
XV.B
Col. 9, cr. (fr. 9 Scott N, --- O)

1.

5.

10.
12.

- - -]ε[- - - - -]ετ̣[- - - - -]µ[- - - - -]νθ[.]δενε[- - ..]αµ.ν, ταῦτα̣[ δὲ ....]ντ[- - -]κοτε̣[..]παθει] καὶ ἀν[ι]κήτωι κα[ὶ] τοῖς
ὁµοδόξ⟦ε[ι]⟧`οι´ς̣ ἀεὶ δυσθετούµεν[οί] τ̣ινες ἔφασα]ν τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδείας] µόνον̣ τῆς α̣[ἰ]σθή[σεως - - -

Nihil Scott 1-3 versus desunt Monet N 4
νθ Monet non legit 5 β̣αµ[.]ν ταυ̣τ̣ Monet
καιαν….τασ - - - N post αµ α̣ vel ε̣ post
αµ.ν spat. vac. 6 νπ......νοπ.... N 7 αν...ποι
N 8 ὁµοδόξ⟦οις⟧`η´ Monet µοδ....σιν...ιδια
N µοδο et ιδυσθε Bassi corr. 9 τινεςεσ N
10 ]α̣ν Monet αισθκα.σ N sed αισθησει
corr. Bassi 10-1 ἡδε|ίας Monet 11 µονε N

…and some, ever dissatisfied both with the unconquerable and with those of the same
opinion, said that pleasant sensations alone are…of sensation…
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XVI.A
αἰσ]|θητῶν κρίσ[ιν - - -]|λέγοµεν εχ[- - -]|ει̣τικοντ[- - - αἰσθά]|νεσθαι δο̣ξαζ[- - -]| δὴ τὰ πά[θη - - | - - -]|αἰσθήσεω̣[ν - - - | - - -]ψιν[- - -]|του ποιοῦν [- - -]| καὶ ὑφεστηκ̣[- - - ἁ]|πλοῦν ἐστ̣ι̣ [- - - |
.]π[….] αἰσθ[- - -]|ντω̣να[.] ταις [- - - πά]|θους γίνεσθαι [- - - αἰσ]|θητόν, οὐ γὰρ ἁ[πλῶς | ἡ]
γεῦσις ἀντι[λαµβά|νετα]ι τοῦ χυλ[οῦ - - - | - - -]αλλα [ - - - | - - -]
…we say that the discrimination of sensibles [has]…affections…sensation…it is not simple…for
taste does not simply apprehend flavor…but…
XVI.B
ßCol. 10, cr. (fr. 10 Scott N, --- O)

1.

5.
̅ ̅ ̅
10.

- - -].νονµα[…
- - -] αὐτοῦ πάθους […] τ̣οῦ̣ µορίου καταλα̣[µ]βα[νε]θ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ
αἰ̣σθητη[ρίου - - ως̣[..]ατον, τὸ δέ πάθος οὐ]χ οὕτως ἀλλὰ
περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθη̣τή
̣ ̣ρι]ον ὑπάρχον ἐµµ̣[…]. ἑαυτό ἑαυτῶν̣
- - -]τ[- - -]α
- - -]αυθ̣[- - -

1 νονµαι̣ Monet νονµακ..µ. N ante νονµαι α̣
vel µ̣ 2 υς ..... πας N 4 τον pro ταλ Ν 5
αἰσθητὰς Scott αισθητας...αντ N 6 [..]τον
Monet σο..τοντων Ν post ατον spat. vac.
τόδε Monet 7 ἀλλα Scott 8 τονσθ Ν sed
τοαισθη corr. Bassi 9 λον Ν sed ριον corr.
Bassi οµ N 9-10 ἔµµεναι Graham 10 µ̣
Monet non legit ς αὐτὸ Monet 11 - - Monet 12 αυτ Monet 11-12 versus desunt
N

…of the affection itself, a part is comprehended by the sense organ,…and the affection
does not exist in this way, but near the sense organ itself…
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XVII.A
- - -]ν̣ τὸ γεγὼ̣ς εσ|[- - -]αι τὸ φράζειν | [- - -]α̣ ὡς οµητιοδω|[- - -]νε̣ν τὸν προς|[- - -]τον
οσοδαναι|[- - -]ε̣ λέγοµεν ὅθεν | [- - -] αἰτίου νοή̣σ[ε]ις̣ | [- - -] ἀναιροῦσιν· οὐ γὰρ | [- - -]εν ⟦οθ⟧
ὥστε κατο|[- - -]τος· αἴτιον γὰρ | [- - -]ε̣ τινός ἐστι το|[- - -]ων τῶ̣ν ον|[- - -]τ̣[..]αισταδαν|[- - -]σ
δύναµιν ου|[- - -]σι καταλαµβα|[- - -] αἰσθήσεις ε|[- - -]ει δύναµις | [- - - ἐ]πὶ σώµατος | [- - -]ως
ο[- - - | - - -]
…we say…whence they reject…the conceptions of the cause…for the cause…of some …the
faculty…sensations…faculty…upon body…
XVII.B
à Col. 10, cr. (--- Scott, fr. 10 in marg. N, --- O)

1.

5.

9.

.]η[- - .]εν[- - α̣θ[..]ην̣[- - - ἐπιφ̣ανεστα[τ - - αν[- - ν̣[..]α̣τοῦ [- - - - -]α̣δυ[- - - - -]σα[- - .]αµε[- - [Too fragmentary to translate]

1 νη Monet 2 ει Monet 3 ας[..]η Monet 34 ἐπι]φανεσ[τ- Macfarlane 6 αἰ[θη]τοῦ
Monet 7 δη Monet 8 ν δὴ Monet δη Bassi
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XVIII.A
χρόνοις, τὴν δ᾽ αἴσθη|σιν τὰ καθ᾽ ἕνα κ[ρι]νεῖν | ἢ µνήµ[η]ς µ[εθ]έξειν, | Ἀπολλοφάν[η]ς ὑπὸ τοῦ
| πιθανοῦ κ[ι]νηθείς, | τὸ µὲν καὶ µνήµην αὐ|ταῖς περιάπτειν κατηι̣|δέσθη, τὸ δ᾽ ἀναλογίας |
µετέχειν προς<ε>δέξα|θ᾽ ὅπως καὶ τοῦ µηκέ|τ᾽ ὄντος ἀποδῶι διαισ|θησι̣ν̣ αὐτῆ̣ι̣ [ὥ]σπερ, ἵνα |
σώσωµεν ἐνάργειαν, | ἄλλας δέον ἐγβάλλειν | ἐναργείας̣ ἢ διαφέρον | τι* τήνδε τινὰ ἦν
[κ]α|[θαι]ρεῖν ἢ̣ [κ]αθάπερ οὐ| [- - -] ἀ̣ναι̣ρου⟦σ⟧|`µεν´ ων [- - - | - - -]
…times, and that the sense discerns things individually or participates in memory. Apollophanes,
moved by the plausible argument, felt ashamed to attach memory to them, but accepted the idea
that they participate in the analogy, in order to give it a clear perception of what no longer exists,
as if in order to retain evidence, we must dismiss other evidence or, if it differs in some way, that
we must overthrow some such evidence, or just as we…reject…
XVIII.B
ßCol. 11, cr. (fr. 11 Scott N, 361X O)

1.

5.

10.

15.

..]ως κ̣ατα̣ [.]εµ[- - .]µ̣..(.)ο̣νεν[- - -]ειν[…
τ̣ό̣δε µητὲ µνή[µης - - ..]σα[- - µετέχειν µήτ’ ἀναλ[ογίας µητ᾽ εἴδ̣ου̣ς, ἀλλὰ
µηδ᾽ ὄναρ οὐκ ἐναργὲ[ς
ὁµοί[ως] ἐστ[ὶ ……]αι
εν[…]χ̣ον ἄλλως [.]εδε
----αµ[- - .]α[- - θ…ευ̣[- - - - -]θ

1 σ[.]ατα Monet νκαι....οµι. Ν …. ν .. ατ …
ιν Ο 2 νον Monet των Ν υνε .. λεν O 3
δοµηγε Ν τοδο Ο 4 deest N 5 µηπανα Ο 6
πιαις Ν sed γιας corr. Bassi µηθε. Ν sed
µητει corr. Bassi µητειχου Ο 7 ολαρ Scott
µηασγαρ Ν µηδοσγαρ Bassi µηδοπαρ Ο 8
π Ν sed εστ corr. Bassi καὶ Monet 9 εν …..
ενας ..... δε Ν 14 - - - Monet 10-15 desunt
NΟ

…this does not participate in memory, nor in the analogy, nor in form, but neither on the
other hand are dreams similarly clear…

* διαφέρον|τι Μonet
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XIX.A
ἐὰν µνήµης ἀναλο|γίας µετέχωσι· [καὶ] | δὴ […………] δῆ|λον ὡς ἡ µνήµη λογισ|µοῦ, καὶ πάντα
πράγµα|τα συνταράττειν· ἑώ[ρων] | γὰρ ὅτι [ο]ὐ τὸν λόγον [ε]ὐ|χερὲς ἦν ἀποδιαλύειν | τὸν κατὰ
τῆς αἰσθητῆς | κινήσ[ε]ως ἔξω καθεσ|τῶτα τος[…..]λ αὐτῆς | απελ̣[..]σε[…..]ε τι|νες ἐν
Ἀριστοβ[ο]ύ̣λου | τινι γράµµατι προσευ|ρηµέν[οι* εὐ]χερ[ῶς] κ̣αιφα|π̣οκα[….]σ µνήµην ε̣|[- - ]ιστω[- - - | - - -] τὸ τεκµή[ριον - - - | - - -]
…if they participate in memory of analogy (?). And…it is clear that memory of reasoning throws
all things into confusion. For seeing that it was not easy to refute the argument which was laid
down concerning perceptible exterior movement…some, having found in a certain book of
Aristobulus…memory…the proof…
XIX.B
à Col. 11, cr. (--- Scott N O)

1.

5.

9.

..]εν [- - νουσιν [- - -]ε̣καια
π[.]ο χρωµ[α- - -]τακα
.]µ̣ενον̣[..]ε[- - -]ειναι
φήσοιµ[εν - - - κατ᾽ ἀριθµὸ[ν - - λεγο̣υ[̣ - - σ…µα [- - …..τα κ[- - [Too fragmentary to translate]

* προσευ|ρηµέν[α Monet

4 ενο Monet, εἶναι Monet 5. φήσοιµ[εν
Macfarlane 6 ἀριθµ[όν] Monet 7 λεγο
Monet 8 Monet non legit
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XX.A
µεθα. τὴν µὲ[ν] γὰρ ὄ|ψιν ὁρατὰ κατα[λ]α̣µβ[ά]|νειν ἡγούµεθ[α, τ]ὴν δὲ | ἁφὴν ἁπτά, κα[ὶ] τ̣ὴν
µὲν | χρώµατος, τὴν δὲ σώ|µατος, καὶ [τ]ὴν ἑτέραν | τοῦ τῆς ἑτ[έ]ρας [κρ̣]ί̣µα[τος] | µηθὲν
π[ολ]υπρ//α//γµ[ο]|νεῖν. ἐπειδήπερ ε̣ἰ συ[ν]|έβαι̣νε τὴν ὄψιν σώµα|τ̣ος µέγεθος καὶ σχῆµα |
κ[α]ταλαµβάνειν, π[ολὺ] | π[ρό]τερον ἂν καὶ σῶµα | ⟦κ[ατ]ελάµβανεν ἢ πολὺ | πρ̣ότερον [ἂν] καὶ
[σῶ]µα⟧ | κα[τ]ελάµ[βανε]ν καὶ | τ[αῦτα - - -]τη | [- - -]µα | [- - For we think that sight comprehends visibles, and touch comprehends tangibles, and that sight is
of color and touch is of body, and that the one sense does not concern itself with the other’s
object of discrimination. Whereas, if it were to happen that sight comprehended the magnitude
and shape of body, much rather would sight have comprehended body, or much rather would it
have comprehended both body and…
XX.B
Col. 12, cr. (fr. 12 Scott N, --- O)

1.

5.

10.

- - -]
µ..
……]η̣στ̣ω̣ν ο[ὐδ’] ἕτ̣ερ]ον ο̣ὐδ᾽ ἕτερον συµ̣βέβ]ηκ[ε]ν ἀλλὰ τ[ά µὲ]ν ταὐτοῦ [..(.)χ]ρήµ̣ατος ἑκατέραν προπίπτει δι[α]φέροντα δεσ[.] καὶ τὰ µὲν
τῆς οὐσίας συµβ[εβηκό̣τα τ̣[ὰ] δὲ τοῦ περὶ̣ τ̣ὴν
ὄψιν σ]υµβεβη[κό]τος
[τὰ δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν ἁφὴν - - -]

1 deest Monet 1-3 desunt N 2 ο[ὐδὲ
Graham ω̣νο Monet ε[.]ε Monet post ο λ̣
vel µ̣ vel δ̣ vel χ̣. 4 τ[…]ν Monet
…και.....ναµατ..ταυ Ν 5 …….. εν …..
καιαλλα Ν εκα corr. Bassi 5-6 ἑκατέραι
Monet 6 προσπιπτει N 7 ante τὰ ας Ν 8
ο..τας Ν sed ουσιας corr. Bassi οὐσίας ο̣ὐδὲ
Scott ουδεβ Bassi 9 καιπαρ ... απο .... γαρ
Ν 10 ..... µεν ........ προς Ν

…neither the one nor the other occurred, but some attributes of the same thing present
themselves differently to each sense, some are the attributes of substance and others are
attributes of what concerns sight [and others are attributes of what concerns touch]…
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XXI.A
ἀντί]|τυπον ἔ[λ]α̣[β]ε̣ καὶ πο̣[λλά]|κις οὐδ[ὲ] αὐ[τὸ] τοῦτο. ε[ἴ]|περ οὖν οὐθὲν ἕτερό[ν] | ἐστι τὸ
σχῆµα τὸ ὁρα[τὸν] | ἢ τῶν χρωµάτω[ν] ἡ [ἐξω]|τάτω θέσις, οὐδὲ τὸ [µέ]|γεθος τὸ ὁρατὸν ἢ τῶ̣[ν]
| πλειόνων χρωµάτω[ν] | ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἑξ[ῆς] θέσι[ς], | [π]ῶ[ς] δυνατὸν τὴν α[ὐ|τ]ῶν χρωµάτων ο̣ὐκ
[οὖ]|σαν [ἀ]ντιληπτικὴν τ̣[ὴν] | ἐξωτάτω θέσιν τῶ[ν] | χρωµάτων καταλαµ[βά]|νειν;
παραπλησί̣[ως δ᾽ εἴ]|περ ο[ὐ]θὲν ἕτε̣[ρον ἐστι] | τὸ ἁπ[τὸ]ν σχ[ῆµα] ἢ̣ [τῶν] | σω[µάτων ἡ
ἀντιτυπία | - - …[the sense organ] takes up the outline and often not the thing itself. If then visible shape is
nothing other than the outermost position of colors, and visible magnitude is nothing other than
the ordered position of several colors, how is it possible that touch, which is incapable of
apprehending colors themselves, is able to comprehend the outermost position of colors?
Similarly, even if tangible shape is nothing other than the [depiction of body…]
XXI.B
à Col. 12, cr. (--- Scott N O)

1.
̅ ̅ ̅
5.

10.

--νο[- - ξω̣[- - κα[- - λαµ[βαν- - βας[- - στε[- - ουθ[- - --νει̣[- - ναπ̣[- - [Too fragmentary to translate]

2 - - - Monet 4 - - - Monet 6 οτε Monet 8
deest Monet 10 ναι Monet
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XXII.A
[- - -] δοκούντων | [- - -] παρῆν µὴ Τι|[µασα]γόρα[ν] Πολυαίνω<ι> | [ἀλλὰ] πολὺ πρότερον |
[Ἐπι]κούρωι συνκατα|τίθεσθαι· κἂν εἰ πάν|τως δὲ ἐπεθυµοῦµ[ε]ν | µάχεσθ(αι) αὐτῶι, ταύτηι |
<ἀ>κόλουθον ἦν, σφ̣ετεριζό|µενος τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν | ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἰδίοις εὑρήµα̣|σιν σεµνύνεται, πα̣ρ̣ὰ |
τε ἄλλο[υς κ]αὶ[....] τού|τωι τὴν [..]σιπην καὶ | τ[ὴ]ν ἀχάρ[ι]στον ἀλαζο|νεία[ν] ἐπ[ι]δεικνῦντας |
[- - -]
Is seems possible that Timasagoras did not agree with Polyaenus but much rather with Epicurus.
And even if we want to contend with him in all ways, it would be in conformity with this: after
appropriating the doctrines of (other) men, one prides himself as if on his own innovations, and
alongside others, who display…and ungrateful imposture…
XXII.B
Col. 13, Cr. (fr. 13 Scott N, --- O)

1.

5.

10.
1.
3.

- - -]σ αισ[- - ς αλλ̣[.]µοδω̣ρο[- - καὶ διὰ τοῦτον [- - …..]ν ὅτι τ[- - ρας τοὐναντί[ον - - λα[..]ον ὥσπερ [- - - εἰµαρµέν[η]ν π.[- - ..].λ̣ον [..]η[.]µ̣[- - να[- - -]η [- - καν[- - ---

1 deest N 2 Ἑρ]µόδορο[ς ‡ νο .. ανα ... µοδ
... Ν 3 τουτῶν Monet τοῦτο Scott τους Ν
sed τουτο corr. Bassi 5 χρας Ν 6 λλα ….
νωςπερι Ν µ̣ Monet 6 [καθ’ εἰ- Macfarlane
7 νπ[- - - Monet νπαν Ν π[οιει Macfarlane
8 λ vel α η .. τη .. Ν η καλω Monet non
legit 9 ρια ...... ηκαλω Ν 10 deest N

ν.
τη
ηκαλω
[Too fragmentary to translate]

A piece of papyrus containing three lines of text is attached to the main body of the column with
goldbeater’s skin. The lines of text on this fragment do not align vertically with those of the rest
of the column, and so it is difficult to determine to which lines of text the fragment should be
appended. Monet doesn’t print the letters in the fragment, and N draws them in lines 7-9. While
the proper place of the fragment could be in lines 7-9, they might also be placed in lines 8-10.
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XXIII.A
τῶν πραγ̣µάτων πε|πτωκότων, ὡς καὶ κα|τ᾽ ἀρ[χὴν] ἐπ[ε]σηµαινό|µεθα τοῦ περὶ τῶν ὁρά|σεων
λόγου. καὶ τὸ πα|ρ᾽ Ἀπολλοδώρωι µέ[γεθος] | µετρε̣ῖ̣ν ἐστιν, λέγοντ̣ι̣ | γε[γ]εν[ν]ηµένου τοῦ |
σώ[µ]ατ[ο]ς ἐκ µυρίων ὁ|µοίω̣ν […]σι̣ν ἀτοµ[ων], | τῆς δὲ χ[ρό]ας ἣν ἐπι[πο]|λῆς εἶν[αι
σ]υµβέβηκε[ν] | ἐκ χ[ι]λ̣ί̣[ων ἀτ]ό̣µ̣ων̣ , ἀ|φὴν καὶ τῶ̣ν ἐνακισχι|λίων ἀντ[ι]λαµβάνεσ|[θαι] καὶ
[τῶν χιλίων, ὅ|ρασιν δὲ τῶν χιλίων | µόνων- - …these things turn out as we indicated at the beginning of our treatment of sight. And it is
possible to measure magnitude in Apollodorus, who says that, since body is produced from tenthousand similar atoms [with…], and skin, which happens to be on the surface, from a thousand
atoms, touch apprehends both nine-thousand and [a thousand, and sight apprehends only a
thousand…]
XXIII.B
Col. 14, Cr. (fr. 14 Scott N, --- O)

1.

5.
̅ ̅ ̅

10.

- - -]η...
- - -] ἐκ τοιο[ύτ]ον ἐστι πρ̣[ὸς] τὸ ταῦτα
κατ᾽ ἀριθµὸν εἶνα[ι] ἄγειν. οὐθὲν παράλογόν
ἐστιν, ὅπερ κἄν φαίνεται
συµπεφωνηκέναι τὸ
πρὸς τὴν ὅρα̣σ̣ι̣ν καὶ τὸ̣
πρὸ[ς] τὴν ἁφὴν σχῆµα
κα[ὶ τὰ] ἕτερα [κα]τ᾽ ἀ̣ριθµὸν
…] καὶ […..]α[- - ---

1 deest Monet N 2 νκποοιο litt. suppositae
Monet 2-3 τοιούτων corr. * 3 - - - ησεις
Scott τοµιησεις Ν 4 ἀριθµὸν τὸν α Scott
καταριθµοντονα..λω Ν 5 ωγειν Scott post
γειν spat. vac. 6 καὶ Monet Scott 7
συµπ̣εφρονηκέναι Scott υµησφαινηκεναιτο
Ν sed συµπεφ.νηκεναιτο corr. Bassi 8
το.υ.οσ τὴν Scott ... τας ... ηνορ Ν 9 ινα
pro ὴν ἁ Ν 10 κα[ὶ? ἕ?]τερα Scott 11 deest
N

it is from such…to bring these things to be individually. Nothing is unreasonable which
appears to harmonize visible shape and tactile shape, and other shapes
individually…and…
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XXIV.A
σι τῶν ἀ[ντι]τυπίαν [σ]υν|αποτελουσῶν ταῖς ἄλ|λαις· καθὸ δὲ σχήµασι | τοιούτοις κέχρηνται | καὶ
µεγέθεσι καὶ τάξ[ε]|σι καὶ θέσεσι, τὴν χρόαν̣, | ἐπεὶ λέγοµεν οὕτω | καὶ χυλοῦ καὶ ὀσµῆς |
κριτικὴν εἶναι τὴν | ἁφὴν ὅτι συµβέβηκ[ε] | καὶ τὰς τούτων γε[ννη]|τικὰς [σ]υναποτελεῖ[ν] | τὴν
ἀν[τί]τυπον ἑνό|τητα· εἰ δὲ µή, καθὸ σώ̣|µατα αµ[..]ο̣υ[…τ]ὰς | ποιότ[ητας - - …which help complete the outline for other (senses). Insofar as they give color to such shapes,
magnitudes, arrangements and positions, since we say that touch is able to distinguish both flavor
and odor, because it happens that the things that produce them help to effect the unity of outline.
If not, insofar as bodies…the qualities…
XXIV.B
Col. 15, Cr. (fr. 15 N, --- O)

--1.
τ[….]σαφ[- - αλλα̣ιων[- - γεγεννη[--- --- ποιοτήτων [- - 5. ̅ ̅ ̅ της ε̣κ[- - .]α[- - µε[- - ζ[.]λις[- - --[Too fragmentary to translate]

1 σασ Monet Ν 2 αλλαι Monet αλλα...µ Ν
3 λελεννη Monet τεγελινη Ν τεγεννη Bassi
4 στητων Ν 5 της .. κα N της .. κ Bassi 6
αυ ... ντ Ν αυ Bassi 7 σχῆ[µα?] Scott σχη
N σχ Bassi 8 ξ[.]λις Monet λωνκαι Ν deest
Bassi
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XXV.A
κρί]|νειν τὸ χρῶµα· ὥστε | κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν | κοινὰ κρίµατ᾽ εἶναι | τῶν αἰσθήσεων τού|[των]
τὸ σχῆµα καὶ τὸ µέ|[γεθ]⟦ων⟧`ος´, ὅν λόγον ἔχει | τ[ὰ το]ῦ χρώµατος π̣ρ̣ὸς | τὸ χρῶ̣µα, τοῦτον
ἐχόν|των [τ]ῶν τοῦ σώµατος | πρὸς τὸ σῶµα κα̣ὶ ὅν | λ̣όγον ἔχει τὸ χρῶµ[α] | πρὸς τὴν διὰ τῆς
ὁρά|σεως [κατ]άληψιν, τοῦ|τον το[ῦ σ]ώµατος π[ρ]ὸς | τὴν δ[ιὰ] τῆς ἁφῆ[ς δι]|δοµ[εν - - …discern color. So that, according to the analogy itself shape and magnitude are objects of
discrimination common to these senses: the ratio which the shape and magnitude of color have
with regard to color, those of body have the same ratio with regard to body; and the ratio which
color has to apprehension through sight, the same ratio has body to (apprehension) through
touch…
XXV.B
Col. 17, cr. (fr. 17 Scott, fr. 16 = 17 N, 354a O)

1.

5.

10.

--- - -]βα̣νε[- - - - -] ἀνωτερο[- - - - -] ἀ̣ναλογί[α]ν τῶν
νεοτ[… τ]ῆς ὀράσεως̣
τὸ δὲ δη[…]ης ⟦φύσεως⟧ ἃ
καὶ ν[…. ἀ]ντιτύπου
- - -]µ̣ατην [.]τ̣ου καὶ τῶν
……..]ω̣ν [τὴ]ν κρίσιν [.
- - -]υ [.] ενα
---

2 ανωγερο N sed ανωτερο corr. Bassi 3
ἀ]νολογί[α]ν Monet ναλογ ... ν .. ον . Ν
ναλογι .. ν Bassi αλλοτ .. ν Cozzi ναλογι ..
νιων Ο 4 νεση N νεστ Bassi Scott Ο σεστ
Cozzi ορασε .. ςφ ... Ν ορασε . σ .. Cozzi
ορασεσο .. Ο 5 ὁ δὲ Scott τῆς Scott
φυσεοςαι Ν φυσε.oσα Cozzi Ο 6 ντγυτσον
Cozzi 7 κατην Monet, κου Monet 8 των
Scott Ν ων Bassi 9 ου Monet ουτενα Ν ου
… ενα Cozzi Ο post υ . vel spat. vac.

…analogy…sight…nature…outline…discrimination…
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XXVI.A
[- - - τῆς ὀράσεως καὶ τῆς ἀ]|κοῆς χωρὶς τῶν ἀνω|τάτω καὶ κοινοτάτων | ἃ προδιήλθοµεν, κρίµα |
κοινὸν οὐκ οἰόµεθα | κατὰ τὸν πρόχειρον | τρ̣όπον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ | τὸν οὐ πρόχειρον µέν, |
κοινότητα δὲ προσφε|ρόµενον ὥστ᾽ ἀναλο|γίαν εὐόδως ἂν ἔ̣χειν ῥηθ̣ῆναι, φήσα[ι]µεν | ἂν κοινὸν
αὐτῶν εἶ|ναι κρίµα τὸ σχῆµα· | πρὸς γὰρ τὸ τῆ[ς] χ[ρ]οᾶς | ἢ τ̣[ὸ] ἐνγραµµάτου | φω[νῆς σχῆµα]
ἔχειν | τιν[ὰ κοινότητα - - -] | τ[η - - …of sight and hearing, except for the highest and most common (senses), which we have
previously discussed, we do not think that it (shape) is a common object of discrimination in any
obvious way, but in a not-so-obvious way it is a common object of discrimination which
transmits a common quality, so that the analogy can be easily expressed. We could say that shape
is an object of discrimination common to these senses. For with regard to the shape of color and
the shape of written sound, it has some [commonality]…
XXVI.B
Col. 18, Cr. (fr. 18 Scott N, 354b O)

1.

5.

10.

- - - φαµὲν]
γὰρ ἐν ὧι λόγωι πρὸς]
τὴν τοῦ χρώµατος ποι]ότητα ἔ]νεστι[ν] ὁ τοῦ χ̣[ρ]ώµατος σχηµατισµός,
ἐν τούτωι τὴν ἄρ[θ]ρωσιν [ε]ἶ̣ναι πρὸς τὴν
τῆς φωνῆς ποιότητα· καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο [σ]χήµατος οὐκ ἀλλοτρ[ίαν
εἴποιµεν ἂν ἑκα̣τέραν εἶν[αι τ]ῶν αἰσθ̣ή[σεων - - -

1 νεγ N sed νεσ corr. Bassi ογου N Ο 3
αρ.νω N sed αρ.ρω corr. Bassi αρ .. ρω Ο 4
συν N sed σιν corr. Bassi 5 [εἶ]ναι Monet
ποιστη Ο 7 αµοτα N sed αλλοτρ corr.
Bassi 8 εἴποµεν Monet εκ .. πε Ο 9 εἶν[α]ι
Monet των Ο

For we say that, the proportion in which the configuration of colors relates to the quality
of color, in the same proportion is articulation to the quality of sound. And in this we
would say that each of the two sensations is not unlike shape.
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XXVII.A
τοῖς κατὰ τοῦτο φάσ|κουσι τὴν φωνὴν σχῆ|µα ἔχειν· εἰ µὲν ἡγεῖτ[ο] | µηδ᾽ ἔχειν τινὰ ἀναλ[ο]|γίαν
τὴν ἄρθρωσιν πρὸ[ς] | τὸν τοῦ ⟦σχη⟧χ\ρ/ώµατος σχη|µατισµόν, ἐβιάζετο | προφανῶς τὴν
ἐνάρ|γειαν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τι|θεὶς κατώικει παραλ|λαγὴν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ σχή|µατος ἀφηκ̣[ὼς] ὄνο|µα,
ἐφωνοµάχει πρὸς | τοὺς κατὰ τὸ[ν] ἑπόµε|νον οὐκ ἐπὶ [τ]ῆς ἀπα|[- - -]* της | [- - - ο̣]νοτη | [- - ]αιπρ[. - - …to those who say, in this regard, that voice has shape. If he believes that articulation does not
have any kind of analogy with the configuration of colors, he clearly does violence to the facts.
But if, after laying this down, he establishes the difference, but allowing that it be called by the
name of shape, he argues semantics with those, according to him who follows not after…
XXVII.B
Col. 19, Cr. (fr. 19 Scott N, 360c O)

1.

5.

9.

[- - - τὰ µὲν σχή-]
µατα τὰ λελεγµένα πασῶν εἶναι κοινά, τῶν
δὲ ποιοτήτων ἀπάσαις, ἂν λέγοιτο κοινὴν
τὴν κρίσιν ἔχειν καθ᾽ ὅσον τὰ µὲν ὅµοια
τὰ δ᾽ ἴ[δ]ια ἐκείνα̣ κ[α]ταλαµβ̣άνει, τὰ δ᾽[ἴ]δια ν[.
τη[..]ε[- - ---

1 [κρι]µατα δὲ λέ<γο?>µεν ἁ[π]α Scott
[σχή]µατα λελεγµνένα Monet δελεγµενα Ν
sed λελεγµενα corr. Bassi µαταδελεγµεναα
Ο 2 τῶν Monet non legit 3 τῶν δὲ Monet
τως N sed των corr. Bassi 4 σαη Ν sed
σαις corr. Bassi 5 χρισινεχηνκαι sed
κρισινεχεινκα corr. Bassi εχην Ο 7
ἐκείν[η] Monet Scott ειν .... π Ν 8 δαµ.ανει
Ο αια N sed δια corr. Bassi 9 deest Scott N
Ο

The so-called shapes are common to all the senses, but one might say that the
discrimination, common to all of the qualities, has, to the extent that the perceiver
comprehends the similar (attributes?) and those proprietary (attributes?), proprietary…

* ἀπα|[ραλλαξίας Monet
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XXVIII.A
ἐξακριβοῦµεν, ὥστε | τῶν αἰσ[θ]ήσεων προσ|υποµνη̣ς{ω}<ο>µεν ὃ προσ|φέρεται ἴδιον ἑκάστ̣η
χω|ρὶς τῆς τῶν κρινοµέ|νων ἐπαισθήσεως. ἡ | µὲν τοίνυν ὅρασις ἰδιώ|τατον ἔ[χ]ει παρὰ τὰς
ἄλ|λας χωρ[ὶ]ς τῆς τῶν [χ]ρω|µάτων καὶ τῶν πε[ρ]ὶ ταῦ|τα κρίσεως, τὸ ἐν ἀποσ|τάσει
κα[τ]αλαµβάνειν | τὰς µορφάς, ἐπαισθα|νοµένην καὶ τοῦ µε|ταξὺ ἑαυ[τ]ῆς τε κἀκεί|[νων
δια]στ[ή]µατ[ος, | ἡ δ᾽ἄκουσις] χωρὶς τῆ[ς | τῶν φων]ῶν καὶ τῶ[ν περὶ | ταῦτα κρίσεως* - - - | - …we speak with precision so that we identify, of the senses, that which is proprietary to each,
apart from the sense perception of that which is discerned. For example, sight has a most peculiar
feature in comparison with the others (apart from the discrimination of colors and of those things
that relate to them), namely that it comprehends forms at a distance, and it even perceives the
distance between itself and them. And hearing, apart from the discrimination of sounds and
[those things that relate to them]...
XXVIII.B
Col. 20, cr. (fr. 20 Scott N, 360d O)

1.

5.

9.

--σῶν [..]ες[……. εὐχερῶς ἐπὶ τὸ φων[ο]ῦ̣[ν
καθὸ ἀκουστόν ἐστιν
καὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἀπεσταλκός, ἡ δ᾽ ὅσφρησις,
χωρὶς τῆς τῶν ὀσµῶν
καὶ] τῶν ἐν [ἐαυ]τῆι καὶ [π]αρακ]ειµένω[ν .(.)]νοτ[̣.]`καὶ ἐπὶ λόγον ἀ[κουστι]κό´[ν]
τ[ὸ] ποεῖσθα[ι τὴ]ν ἐπαί[σθησιν]

3 καθοκουστον Ο 5
οσφρησυσ Ο 7 πον N sed
των corr. Bassi 7 αὑ]τῇ
Scott 8 κ]αὶ ὥ[σπερ Monet
νος N supra 8
καιεπιλογονα - - - κ[ρ?]
Scott καιεπιλογον Ν
καιεπιλογονα - - - κο Ο 9
νοπα N ν . πα Bassi

…easily on that which produces sound, inasmuch as it is audible and has emitted sound.
And smell, apart from the discrimination of odors, both of those which are in it (the form)
and of those which are nearby...and on an audible word, making the sense perception...

* καὶ τῶ[- - - Monet
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XXIX.A
τῶν ἐν αὑτῆ<ι> µόνο[ν] | π[ρ]οσφέρεσθα[ι] τὴν κ[ρί]|σ[ι]ν· ἡ δὲ ἁφὴ κατὰ µὲ[ν] | τὸ ἴ̣διον τὸ
µηδεµίας | ἀντιλαµβάνεσθαι ποι|ότητος· κατὰ δὲ τὸ κοινόν, | ἧ<ι> ποιὰ σάρξ ἐστιν, ὃ
παρ̣|ακ̣[ο]λουθεῖ κα̣ὶ ταῖς ἄλ̣|λαις αἰσθήσεσιν, τὸ ἑτε|ρογενῶν ποιοτήτ̣ων | ἀντιλαµβάνεσθαι·
[σκ]λη|ρῶν̣ γὰρ καὶ µ[α]λακῶ[ν] | οὖσ[α] κριτικὴ καταλαµ|βάνει καὶ θερµὰ καὶ | ψυχρά, τά τε ἐν
ἑαυτῆι | καὶ παρ᾽ ἑαυτῆ[ι] ὑπερ | […..]ουνωνκ[- - - | …..]πασαι τεκ[- - - | - - -]κας[- - - | - - …it only passes judgment (κρίσιν) on [objects] in itself. But touch, for its proprietary function,
doesn’t apprehend the quality of anything, but for its common function (by which flesh is
characterized), which is also inseparably connected to other sensations, it apprehends qualities of
different types. For being capable of discerning hard and soft, it comprehends also hot and cold,
both in itself and beside itself….
XXIX.B
Col. 21, cr. (fr. 21 Scott N, 355e O)

1.
̅ ̅ ̅
5.

10.

[- - - κατ]αψεύδον[τ]α[ί τιν]ες καὶ κρίνειν λέγουσι. τῆς ὁράσεως τοίνυν στερ̣εµνιότητα µὴ κρινούσης,
καταψεύδονταί τινες
κρ̣ίνειν· νοµιζόντες
ὑποβ[ά]λλειν γὰρ αὐτὴν
καθ᾽ ἁπλῆν προσβο[λ]ὴν
ὅταν π[έ]τρας ὁρῶµ̣[ε]ν̣

1 αυευ Ν sed αψευ corr. Bassi 2 νον . α N - - α Bassi εσκαρκρι Ο 4 στειεµνι Ο 5
στητα N Ο sed οτητα corr. Bassi 6
καταυευδονται N sed καταψευδονται corr.
Bassi 7 κηνειν Ο νειη Ν sed νειν corr.
Bassi 8 υγω Ο µειν N sed λλειν corr. Bassi
10 σταν N sed οταν corr. Bassi εταν Ο
τραωρωµ̣ O

…some err and say that (the senses) discern. For example, although sight does not
discern solidity, some wrongly claim that it does discern; thinking that sight conveys it by
a simple application whenever we see stones...
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XXX.A
κα[θ᾽ ἁπλῆ]ν̣ προσβο|λὴ[ν κ]α̣[τ]αλαµβάνειν | καὶ ἀ[ναί]σθητον καὶ αἰσ|θα[νόµε]ν̣ο̣ν καὶ ζῶιον |
κ(αὶ) οὺ̣ [ζῶιον] τόνδε τινὰ | ἄνθ[ρωπ]ον καὶ `τὸ´ τοιό|νδε [ζῶ]ιον καὶ µᾶλλον | καὶ τ[ὸ]
παραπλήσι[ο]ν· πά|ντ[α οὖ]ν τούτων κρ̣ί̣|νουσιν̣ καθ᾽ ἁπλῆν προσ|βολὴν, καὶ σχῆµα καὶ |
µέγ[ε]θος ἁπτὸν εἶν[αι. οὐκ]* | µόνον κρίνουσι̣ [δὲ] καὶ | δυσωδ[ί]αν̣ ἐκ τοῦ τ̣[ὸ το]|ι̣όνδε χρῶµα
πρ[οσπί]|πτειν µ̣[..]υ[…]ηρ[….] | θεωρηχ[- - -]αµ|παξτο[- - - | - - …through a simple application one comprehends that some such man and such a creature are
both insentient and sentient, and both living and non-living, and more and the like. They discern
all of these things through a simple application, as well as its being a certain shape and tangible
magnitude. And not only do they discern unpleasant odor by encountering such a color <that is
known to appear in objects of unpleasant odor>…
XXX.B
Col. 22, cr. (fr. 22 Scott N, 355f O)

1.
̅ ̅ ̅
5.

10.

- - -]οµα
λέγ̣[ειν] καὶ̣ τὰς ἄλλας
φάσεις ὁρᾶν· καὶ ὅταν̣
µὴ τ̣ὸ̣ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα µόνον χρόνο[ν
ὑποπί̣[π]τ̣ον κρίνε̣σθ[α]ι λέγωσ[ι]ν [ἁ]πλω̣[ς
ἀ]λλὰ καὶ τὸ ε[ἰς] τὸ µετὰ
ταῦθ᾽[ἧι] ἐπ̣[ικ]είµενο[ν,
ἔτι δ᾽ ὅταν […]ιαι[…

1 deest Scott ο̣να Monet oν O 2 λογ Ο ωι
pro έγ N 3 φασεπ Ν sed φασεις corr. Bass
φασειωραν Ο post ὁρᾶν spat. vac. 6 των Ν
θο Ν Ο sed εσ corr. Bassi 7 ε pro θ Ο
λεγωσ …… σιν … Ν λεγωσ Bassi 8 ονα
Ν sed λλα corr. Bassi σ . ιο pro ὸ ε[ὶς] τὸ
Scott Ν τοσ .. ιοµετα Ο 9 ταυς Ν Ο sed
ταυθ corr. Bassi [ἐ]σ[ό]µενο[ν?] Scott ο ..
µενο Ν 10 αισ Ν sed αι corr. Bassi ογαρ Ο

…[they] say… and observe other sayings. And whenever they say that not only is that
(color) which falls [upon the senses] at the present time discerned simply, but also that
supervenes on this at a later time, and again, whenever….

* ειν[…..] Monet
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XXXI.A
διὰ παρατηρήσεω[ς ὑ]π̣ολ̣αµβάνοντες, κ[αὶ] | ὅταν [σ]ωµάτων ὡς σωµάτων κ[ρ]ιτικήν, [καὶ]
ὅταν τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ κ[α]ινὰ δοκ[ι]µάζειν, κα[ὶ] ὅταν πολυπραγµονεῖν ὅλως περὶ τῶν ἄλλαις
α[ἰ]θήσεσιν κρ[ι]νοµένων τὴν µηδ᾽ ε[ἰ] τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν αἰσθήσις ἑτέρα γινώ[σ]κουσαν, καὶ ὅταν
καµ[.]αλλ[..] κ̣α̣θ̣᾽ ὑπερβολὴν επ[….]αι σχή|µατα̣ καὶ π̣[ροσ]έτι τὰ µείζον{τ}α δὴ [- - - | - - -]ν
κρίνει κ[- - - εὐ]χυλίας τ[- - -]µηµο[- - …they…conceiving of this notion as a result of observation, and whenever [they say that] the
sense, which does not even understand generally whether there is a different sense, is able to
discern bodies as bodies, and that it distinguishes old things and novel things and that in general
it meddles in that which is discerned by the other senses, and whenever [they say
that]…excessively…shapes, and in addition it discerns the greater <from the lesser>,
and…succulence…
XXXI.B
Col. 23, cr. (fr. 23 Scott N, 356g O)

1.
̅ ̅ ̅
5.
>--9.

…]αι[..]π̣ρ̣[- - -]αια[- - ταπλοµο[..]σ̣αι διαφέροντα, καὶ ὅταν χρόνον
εἴθ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἐλάχιστον
ε̣ἴ̣τε τὸν καθ᾽ αὑτόν, καὶ
ὅταν [ἀ]λγηδόν[α] κατὰ
τὸ ὁρι̣[σ]τικὸν [χ]ρ̣ῶµα,
τ[ῆς δ᾽] ἀκοῆς καταψεύδο[νταί τιν]ες̣ καὶ ὅ[ταν

1 deest Scott αια - - - ν Ν 2 ταολοµο … και
Ν γα .. λοµο Ο 3 ροκ .. α Ο 4 εµχιστον Ο
6 τηδον Ν sed γηδον corr. Bassi 8
καταψου Ο 9 σεκαιο Ν sed εσκαιο corr.
Bassi εικαις Ο

…which are different.., whenever [one perceives] time, either simply the minimal unit or
time in itself, and whenever [one perceives] pain by its characteristic color. And others
speak falsely of hearing, and whenever….
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XXXII.A
α[- - -]διν[- - -] ἕως ἂν εω[- - -]ους[..]σ̣υνος ἀν|τιλαµβάν[εσ]θαι καὶ οὐ|χ ἧι συµβ[έβ]ηκε τούτων |
εἶναι κα[ὶ ὅτα]ν τοῦδε ἢ | τοῦδε ἀν[θρώ]που, καὶ ὅ|ταν Ἕλλη[νο]ς ἢ βαρβά|ρου, καὶ ὅτα[ν]
τ̣ραγω<ι>δοῦ ἢ κωµω<ι>δ[ο]ῦ, καὶ ὅταν | ζέο̣ντος χ[αλ]κ̣οῦ κ̣α̣|τὰ τὰς τοίων ἢ τ̣[οίων] |
ἀντιλήψει̣ς, καὶ ὅταν | τὰ[ς] τῶν ἐµπείρων ἀκριβεστέρα[ς] εἶναι καὶ | τετρῖφθαι, καὶ ὅταν
κε̣ι̣|ζ[….]ς και η[- - - | …]ιης κριτ[ι]κὴν ε|[….]αµδε[- - - | - - …until …it apprehends…and not in the manner in which it happens to be of them. And
whenever [one perceives] this man or that man, and whenever one perceives] a Greek or a
barbarian, and whenever [one perceives] a tragedian or a comedian, and whenever [one
perceives] a boiling caldron, according to apprehensions of this or that kind, and whenever one
perceives that] the apprehensions of the experienced are keener and are worn down, and
whenever…capable of perceiving…
XXXII.B
Col. 24, cr. (fr. 24 Scott N, 356h O)

1.

5.
̅ ̅ ̅
9.

νης [.]ρες[…..]ιας ἀντιλ̣αµβ̣άνεσθαι καὶ ὅταν
πάντας τῆς αὐτῆς ἀκούειν ἢ τῆς ὁµοίας,
οὐδ᾽ εἴ τις ὅ[λ]ω̣ς ἕτερος ἀκούει καταλ̣αµβανούσης· καὶ ὅ[τ]α̣ν τὴν
αὐτὴν κατ’ ἀρ̣[ιθ]µὸν
δισ̣[- - -]η
---

1 σαυ .. ασι Ν σαυ .. ασα Bassi νης - - - ασι
Ο 2 αµεανεσθαι Ν λαµ.ανεσθαι Bassi καις
N sed καιοταν corr. Bassi καισην Ο 3 πις
pro τῆς O 4 κουοιν Ν sed κουειν corr.
Bassi 5 ουδηι Ν sed ουδει corr. Bassi της
Ο 8 καταλαβὸν Monet κατα..βον Scott
κατα ... ον Ν κατα .. βον Bassi Ο 9 διο Ν
δισ Bassi σ could be (ο).

…[that] it apprehends…. And [they err] whenever [they say that] all hear the same or a
similar [sound], if someone else does not hear entirely that which was comprehended.
And whenever [they say that]…the same in number…
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XXXIII.A
νη ἔτι περὶ τ̣ο̣ύτου | ψεύδους τε ὄντος δ̣ι̣ὰ | τὸ τὴν προενεχθ[εῖ]σαν | εὐθέως φθείρεσθ[α]ι, καὶ |
ὅταν µέλος καὶ ῥυ[θ]µὸν καὶ µέτρο[ν] κρίνειν καὶ ποήµα [κ]αὶ λέξιν καλὴν̣ [κ]αὶ αἰσχρ̣ὰν̣ καὶ
π̣ρέπ[ο]υσαν κα[ὶ] ἀπρεπῆ· | τῆς δ᾽ ὀσφρήσε̣[ως ὅ]ταν | ὅµοιον εἰπ[όντες, ταύ]|τ̣η̣ι̣ ἢ λιβα[νωτοῦ
π]ε|ριτίθωσιν κ[ρίσιν ἢ τοι]|ούτ̣ω̣ν, καὶ ὅ̣[ταν ….] | ταῖς ἅλλαις ὀσ̣φ̣[ρήσεσι] | τας [..]ταρ[- - -]ται
[- - -] ενα|µα[- - -]σαι[- - -] | τηνπ [- - - | - - …yet concerning this, which is untrue due to the swift destruction of the uttered sound, and
whenever [they say that hearing] discerns melody, both rhythm and meter, and a poem and its
style to be good or bad, suitable or unsuitable. And concerning smell whenever, speaking in a
similar manner, they attribute to this sense the discerment of frankincense or of such odors. And
whenever…to other smellings….
XXXIII.B
Col. 25, cr. (fr. 25 Scott N, 357i O)

1.

5.
8.

τὸ ὄζον πώρρ[ω]θεν
ἕλκεσθαι καὶ ὅτ[αν] τοὺς
χρηστοὺς οἴνους καὶ
µοχθηροὺς δι[α]κρίνειν
κα[ὶ τὰς] συµφ[ερ]ούσας
καὶ ἀσυµ̣[φ]όρ[ους ὀ]σµάς·
τῆς δὲ̣ γε[ύσε]ως νοµιζόντ[ες …]υ̣νη̣ρειν
---

1 πσερρ.θεν Ν πωρρ.θεν Bassi 2 καιθ Ν
sed καιο corr. Bassi καο Ο 3 χρητους Ν
χρη.τους Bassi 4 µοχοηρους Ν sed
µοχθηρους corr. Bassi 5 συµου … ουσας
Ο 6 ογ Ν sed ορ corr. Bassi καιαου - - - σρ
- - - µας Ο 7 τηςδηθ Ν τησδ . γε Bassi
τησδογε Ο 8 κοντ Ν sed ζοντ corr. Bassi
ναρει Scott Ο

...that which stinks is inhaled from afar, and whenever [they say that smell] distinguishes
fresh and stale wines and pleasing and displeasing odors. And concerning taste, some,
thinking…
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XXXIV.A
ν[.] ἴδ[ι]α [- - -]αξ[- - -] | τοῦ σώµατός εἰσιν [- - - | ....]µεν [..]ηιχο[.]υων̣ | […]νο̣[.]δ[…]⟦χ⟧
`κ´ρεων [.. | τ]ῶν ἄλλων κα[ὶ] τῶ̣ν̣ | θερµῶν καὶ ψυχρῶ[ν] | χυλῶν κατὰ τὸ ἴδ[ιο]ν
ἀ[ντι]λαµβάνεται [οὐχ] ὅτ̣[ι | π]άσαις τα[ῖ]ς γεύσεσ[ι]ν ὁ αὐτὸς κατὰ θερµὸν υν|[……..] χυλὸς [- -]|πα[.] καὶ [- - - | - - -]ει καὶ [- - - | - - -]τω[….]σε[- - - | - - -]ικα[- - - | - - -]σ̣ινε[- - - | - - -] δυ[- - | - - -] ευ[- - - | - - …proprietary [functions]…are of the body…[taste] apprehends others, both of hot and of cold
flavors, according to its peculiar function, not because flavor (?) is the same for all tastings…
XXXIV.B
Col. 26, cr. (fr. 26 Scott N, 357k O)

1.

>--6.
8.

…….]ν εἰπεῖν ηµ[…….]ατικαις
τη̣…ν̣ε̣µη̣ εἰ ἡδοναὶ
γεύ̣[σ]εις ἀκριβέστεραι
τῆ[ς δ᾽ ἁφ]ῆ̣ς ὅτ̣αν̣ φ[ώτω//ν ο//[- - καὶ µ[- - -] τοῖς ὀρατ]//οῖς// [.]ιµ[…..]νον.
---

1 νε .. πεινη Ν νε Bassi 2 µ - - - εανρ Ν µ - - Bassi ατιλαν Ο 3 τη̣νεµη Monet τη - - µ - - - δε Ν τη - - - µ Bassi 4 ἀκριβεστέραν
Scott γευ . δησακριρεστεραν Ν γευ .
εισακβιρεστεραν Bassi 5 φήσο[µε?]ν φ
Scott φι - - - σο - - - νφ Ν σο - - - ν Bassi
5-6 φή̣σ̣ω[σι] Monet 6 litt. //ν ο// O N
τωνοσ Ν τω Bassi τω .. υνο Ο 7 καιλ Bassi
οιςοιν Ν τοις .. ν Bassi τοις συν Ο 8 litt.
//οῖς// O

…to say… if [concerning taste] pleasures are keener tastings, and concerning touch,
whenever…of the eyes…and…with visibles….
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XXXV.A
- - -]ε[..]ε|[- - -]ν|[- - - | - - - | - - - | - - -]ν̣η | [ - - - ]
[Too fragmentary to translate]
XXXV.B
Col. 27, cr. (fr. 27 Scott N, 359l O)

1.

5.

9.

--φα[ν]ούµενοι τὸ [γίν]εσθαι, καὶ λευκαίνεσθαι
µὲν καὶ µελαίνε[σ]θαι
λέ[γουσι] τὴν ὄψ[ιν], λευκο[ῦ] δὲ καὶ µέλα[νος τὴν
κατάλ]η[ψ]ιν µ[ὴ π]οεῖσθαι· τὸ δ᾽ ἀν[ά]λογον [κ]αὶ
ἐ[πὶ] τῶν ἄλλων ἀ[ἰσ]θή[σεων - - -

1 ασα Ν non legit Monet Scott Bassi 2
φα[ν]οῦµεν[?] οπο Scott φ .. ουµενοπο ...
νες N φα . ουµενοιτο ... ες Bassi φα ..
ουµενοπο … εσ Ο 3 λουκαινεσθαι Ν Ο sed
λευκαινεσυαι corr. Bassi 5 λε ... στηνου
Scott ηστηνου .. µευ Ν στηνου .. λευ Bassi
στηνου Ο 6 κο[ν?] Scott µελα .. του Ν
µελα Bassi 7 ητινµ Ν Ο νµ Bassi ν?]οεῖσ
Scott 9 θαισο Ν sed θαιτο corr. Bassi

…seeming…to become…, and they say that sight is lightened or darkened, but that it
does not produce a comprehension of white and of black. And the analogy also [holds
true] for the other sensations…
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XXXVI.A
- - - | .]εγεες[..]σ[.]ν[- - -]|εσθα̣ι [- - -]|τοσχ[- - - | - - -]
[Too fragmentary to translate]
XXXVI.B
Col. 28, cr. (fr. 28 Scott, -- N, 359m O)

1.

5.
8.

….]νεπαι̣[- - πο [τὸ]ν α//ἴ//τ//ιον// [..]//νε//[- - τὴν καὶ µη̣[- - -]ε̣φ [ἐστηκότων̣ [- - λα[.]ησ̣π[- - …]θως κα̣ὶ̣[- - κρ̣[ίσι]ν καὶ̣ [- - τες̣[…]αυ[- - …the cause…discrimination…

1 νεπαιτι Monet 2 litt. //ἴ// O Scott Monet
litt. //ιον// O Scott Monet litt. //νε// O Scott
Monet 3 µν̣ Monet 6 εωςκ̣α Monet θωσα
Ο 7 κρίσιν Monet 8 τεσ..καυ Ο
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